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WAR AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: NUCLEAR POLICY,
DISTRIBUTION, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
ELAINE SCARRYt
"Every nation," wrote Kant, "must be so organized internally
that not the head of the nation-for whom, properly speaking, war
has no cost (since he puts the expense off on others, namely the
people)-but rather the people who pay for it have the decisive voice
as to whether or not there should be war."1 He then added in
parenthesis: "Of course, this necessarily presupposes the realization
of the idea of that original contract."2 This exercise of the popula-
tion's voice, and with it, the affirmation of the social contract, is
partly ensured in conventional war by the fact that the population
is carrying the guns. Hobbes acknowledged the militiry as the final
test point of consent when, in Behemoth, he wrote: "[I]f men know
not their duty, what is there that can force them to obey the laws.
An army, you will say. But what shall force the army?"
3
Kant asserted that war ought to be consensual; Hobbes asserted
that war is consensual. When both the "ought" and the "is" are held
visibly side by side, they together make clear the extremity of the
dissolution of the social contract that comes about when a new form
of weapon is invented that is wholly independent of the population's
authorization. Everyday life continually puts before us the claim
that in the emergency of war, when our own survival is at stake,
some of the operations of consent have to fall away because of the
speed required to respond. But in contract theory in general-as
well as in one very specific social contract, the United States
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1I. KANT, On the Proverb That May be True in Theory, But is of No Practical Use, in
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON PoLIcs, HISTORY AND MORALS 61, 88 (T.
Humphrey trans. 1983).
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Constitution-provisions are made so that consent and the express
act of contract become more explicit, not less explicit, at moments
of war.
The fundamental logic of Locke's consent theory was to
differentiate societies brought about by contract from those brought
about by "force of arms." 4 Thus, if within a contractual society an
occasion arises that necessitates the use of arms, the licensing of
those arms must be explicit precisely to ensure that the society does
not at that moment begin to shift back into the very blur of
coercion that the contract replaced and from which it sought to
distinguish itself. The consent of a people ought to be more express
in entering war than at almost any other time both because of the
adversity the war will bring (the bodies of the population are subject
to the risk of great injury) and also because the existence of the
nation (the elemental social pact) is itself at risk. The deliberation
and slowness with which a contractual society ought to go to war is
described by Justice Story:
War, in its best estate, never fails to impose upon the people the
most burdensome taxes, and personal sufferings. It is always
injurious, and sometimes subversive of the great commercial,
manufacturing, and agricultural interests. Nay, it always involves
the prosperity, and not unfrequently the existence, of a nation....
It should therefore be difficult in a republic to declare war; but
not to make peace.
5
What prompts Story to write this passage is article I, section 8 of the
Constitution which-by requiring from Congress a formal declara-
tion of war-provides within our own social contract the highly self-
conscious, overt act of consent that contract theorists insisted upon.
4 SeeJ. LOCKE, SECOND TREATIsE OF GOVERNMENT 8, 46, 47, 66-68, 101-24 (C. B.
Macpherson ed. 1980) (6th ed. 1764); see also Dunn, Consent in the Political Theory of
John Locke, in LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON LOCKE'S POLITICAL IDEA 154
(G. Schochet ed. 1971) (noting that behavior which is caused by an external force,
such as force of arms, does not imply free choice). Hobbes's chapter in the Leviathan
on the generation of the common-wealth begins: "The finall Cause, End, or Designe
of men.., in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see
them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation... ; that
is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre .... " T.
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 223 (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1968) (1651). The self-consciousness
with which the American founders, as well as earlier contractual societies, positioned
contract against force, is elaborated later in the Article. See infra text accompanying
notes 57-58, 118-135, & 164.
5 J. STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrIUION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH
A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND
STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITITION 87 (4th ed. 1873).
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The declaratory power was given to Congress, rather than to the
President or to either the House or the Senate acting alone, to
ensure deliberation: the reasons for going to war must prove
persuasive enough to hold up under the scrutiny of the large
numbers of persons who together make up the House and the
Senate. The deliberative process is not private and introspective; it
is public, open to view, and subject to debate and constant challenge
by all assembled. Though it is difficult and time-consuming to
convert hundreds of representatives from uncertainty to the
decisiveness required for a declaration of war, this very unwieldiness
was saluted as a great virtue at the original constitutional conven-
tion,6 and again by later jurists who, like Story, argued that a
country must be slow to go to war but quick to attain peace.
7
The longstanding United States strategic policy of presidential
first-use of nuclear weapons8 is starkly incompatible with the
6 For statements by Oliver Elsworth and George Mason, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 118-119.
7 For statements byJoseph Story and William Rawle, see supra text accompanying
note 5 and see infra text accompanying notes 121-122.
'The most comprehensive attempt to track the paper record through which
United States presidents have assumed control over nuclear weapons is Frank Graham
Klotz's unpublished Oxford University D. Phil. dissertation. See F.G. Klotz, The U.S.
President and the Control of Strategic Nuclear Weapons (1980) (unpublished
manuscript). No published account of the sequence of presidential directives
formalizing this strategic policy is available to the population. No president has
addressed the population (in his State of the Union speech or on any other occasion)
about this national policy.
Perhaps in part as a result, a 1984 Public Agenda Foundation poll found that
81% of the United States population were unaware of the nation's first-use policy;
they believed that the country had nuclear weapons for defensive purposes only. See
Yankelovich & Doble, The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R., 63 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 45 (1984) (citing PUBLIC AGENDA FOUNDATION & CENTER FOR FOREIGN
POLICY DEVELOPMENT AT BROWN UNIVERSITY (co-authors), VOTER OPTIONS ON
NUCLEAR ARMS POLICY: A BRIEFING BOOK FOR THE 1984 ELECTIONS 34 (1984)). The
poll followed an eight-year period during which the issue had been openly, but only
occasionally, addressed by political and religious leaders. See, e.g., First Use of Nuclear
Weapons: PreservingResponsible Control: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Internation-
al Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations of the House
of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter Hearings: First Use of
Nuclear Weapons]; Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the
Atlantic Alliance, reprinted in NO-FIRST-USE 4 (F. BlackabyJ. Goldblat, & S. Lodgaard
eds. 1984) (originally an influential 1982 Foreign Affairs article); NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND
OUR RESPONSE vii (1983) (urging NATO to adopt a no first-use policy).
Political, legal, and religious concern tends not to be widely reported in the
press: when 1988 presidential candidateJesseJackson pledged no first-use, the LA.
Times devoted a headline to the announcement. SeeJackson Sees First Use as Irrationa4
L.A. Times, May 27, 1988, pt. I, at 1, col. 1. Their act was unusual, though, and the
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country's constitutionally mandated requirement for a congressional
declaration of war. But the gravity of the country's present nuclear
arms policy only emerges fully into view when article I, section 8 is
seen in relation to a second consensual site available to the
population in conventional war. Even if a society should fail,
through its congress or parliament, to engage in an explicit act of
consensual declaration, the act of calling upon the population, the
call to arms, itself requires-as Hobbes reminds us-a direct courting
of the population's consent. 9 In conventional war, a population's
authorization of war is ongoing in that authorization occurs both at
the threshold and at the interior of war.
The consensual practice at the threshold becomes visible by
inversion in eras when those drafted have refused to cross over the
entry way. Alexander Bickel wrote that "the waging of war needs
issue did not become part of the election contest. OnJanuary 3, 1989, Representative
Weiss of New York introduced ajoint resolution on first-use, which was referred to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services (March 1,
1989), but did not receive public attention. See H.R.J. Res. 46, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989). Nor was press attention given to the 1987 lawsuit against presidential first-use
brought by California Representative Dellums. See infra note 33. The American
public's attention to the subject is often prompted by international, rather than
national, sources, such as the Soviet Union's 1990 reiteration in Vienna of its own
1982 pledge against first-use; Andrei Sakharov's editorial shortly before his death
urging the United States to abdicate first-use, see Sakharov, Sakharov on Gorbachev "
Bush, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1989, at Cl, col. 1; Presidents'Answers Don't Always Answer,
Int'l Herald Tribune, Dec. 4, 1989, at 6; and the November 1990 Stockholm
Declaration made by the Swedish Initiative for the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear
War (a coalition of all six political parties of the Swedish Parliament and nine
professional organizations against nuclear arms) which calls for the nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons to countries where they do not yet exist and the international
delegitimization of nuclear weapons in countries where they already exist. The Swedish
Initiative stipulated that first-use should be eliminated, even before international
delegitimization of all nuclear weapons can be fully achieved:
Delegitimize the use of nuclear weapons .... [Olne realistic step towards
the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, should be to negotiate an
international convention banning the use, or threat of use, of nuclear
weapons. Consequently, all nuclear weapons countries should declare a
policy of no-first-use and adapt their military structures to this policy.
ACION PROGRAM FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR 19 (S.
Hellman ed. 1990); see id. at 9, 14, 19.
9 With the invention of nuclear arms and the progressively more formalized policy
of presidential first-use, United States presidents have ceased to view the article I
requirement for a congressional declaration as binding even when entering
conventional war; thus, both the Korean War and the Vietnam War were undeclared.
Yet precisely because these wars were fought with conventional weapons, the second
species of consent still protected the country by permitting the voice of the
population to be heard.
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continuous political support [and] it is subject to a continuous
round of informal referenda." 10 During the Vietnam period, the
reflexes of consent were exercised and steadily sharpened. The
antiwar movement, he wrote, succeeded in "toppling a sitting
president, in the midst of war, in 1968, before a single national vote
had been cast."" For Bickel, it is the very quality of constraint in
the draft that insures ongoing scrutiny of the war:
A democratic state which fights with a conscripted popular army,
as most states like ours have done since the French Revolution,
will do so effectively with difficulty when a large and intense body
of opinion, particularly among those of fighting age, resolutely
opposes the war on moral and political grounds. A conscripted
army requires more than majority political decision to fight a war
12
That display of consensual powers at the threshold has also been
visible in other eras. The first federal conscription bill, issued by
Abraham Lincoln, at once gave rise to the 1863 Draft Riots in New
York City, and similar, if much less fully documented, outbreaks of
draft resistance, riot, or near-rebellion are said to have occurred in
Boston and smaller towns in New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois,
Indiana, and Ohio.13 Still earlier, toward the end of the War of
1812, the draft had been proposed by the Secretary of War. It
never left the proposal stage because it was strongly resisted as
unconstitutional.
1 4
1 0 A. BICKEL, THE MoRAIrY OF CONSENT 102-03 (1975).
" Id. at 102.
12 Id.
15 SeeJ. MCCAGUE, THE SECOND REBELLION: THE STORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
DRAFr RIOTS OF 1863, at 143 (1968) (describing the unrest across the Northern
states). Many of the incidents, as well as the names of participants and those killed
are reconstructed in A. COOK, THE ARMIEs OF THE STREETS: THE NEW YORK CITY
DRAFT RIOTS OF 1863 (1974). Resistance may also, asJoseph Story's editor observed,
be initiated by national or state authorities:
When the late civil war broke out, and the President issued his call for
75,000 militia, apportioned among the several States which had not declared
their secession, the governors of several of the border States responded with
either a peremptory or a qualified refusal. The governors of Virginia, North
Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas refused in the most
positive, and some of them in insulting terms ... [and they contested its
constitutionality].
J. STORY, supra note 5, at 117 n.5.
14 See T. DWIGHT, HISTORY OF THE HARTFORD CONVENTION 358-62 (1833), cited
inJ. STORY, supra note 5, at 99 n.1 (asserting that the Constitution gives Congress no
power to draft).
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As the exercise of the population's authorization can be seen at
the threshold, so it can be seen in the interior of war as well.
15
Those who enter the war continue to exercise, on a day by day basis,
their power to give or to withhold consent. Again the photographic
negative-the withdrawal of consent in the actions of mutiny or
rebellion-bestows clarity on the soldiers' more ordinary acts of co-
operation and participation. Here is one such photographic
negative, an irregularity in the rhythm of artillery fire in World War
I France:
Promptly at ten the next morning the artillery bombardment
resumed-only to be checked immediately by a peculiar incident.
In the fields surrounding the barracks were nearly a thousand
horses which had not been fed for twenty-four hours. Now the
rebels herded them together and drove them riderless down the
road to the town of La Courtine .... 16
15 The Vietnam War has been introduced here as the model of threshold consent
because of the visible refusal by many of draft age to enter. But the exercise of
consent and dissent was, of course, continuing to be enacted at the center by those
who had initially agreed to go. In a "top-secret" cable to President Kennedy on
September 19, 1963, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge summarized General Minh's
litany of the factors weakening the Saigon-American side. This list began with the
greater allegiance of the population and university students to the Viet Cong,
proceeded to the problem of graft in the Vietnamese distribution of U.S. aid, and
climaxed with the observation that "the 'Heart of the Army is not in the war.'" N.
SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE: JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN VIETNAM 364
(1988) (quoting Cable from Henry Cabot Lodge toJohn F. Kennedy (Sept. 19, 1963)).
Sheehan's biography chronicles the wayJohn Paul Vann's acute criticisms of the U.S.
actions in Vietnam influencedjournalists who in turn communicated this picture to
Americans at home. See id. at 316, 342. The book simultaneously provides a portrait
of the influence of civilians throughout the countryside. See id. at 351, 355, 357, 371.
In effect, the United States armed a large portion of the population, many of whom
chose to use their arms on behalf of the Viet Cong. Between November of 1962 and
the early months of 1964, according to Sheehan: "with the exception of the heavy
weapons specialists, the U.S. government armed virtually every fighter-right down to
the local hamlet guerrillas-on the Communist side." Id. at 374; see also id. at 313-14,
503-08 (describing the large quantities of arms in Communist possession).
So, too, the other U.S. wars that display the phenomenon of threshold consent
also illustrate the ongoing exercise of the power to consent or dissent. The relative
speed with which the United States extricated itself from the War of 1812 is
conventionally attributed to the war's unpopularity with the country's population.
The part played in the Civil War by the "collapse" of the Confederate army has also
been documented: "Nearly 250,000 eligible whites are estimated to have deserted or
to have avoided conscription altogether." J. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK:
EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE 30 (1985).
16 R. WATT, DARE CALL IT TREASON 275 (1963). The French source on which
Watt bases his narration of the mutiny-P. POITEVIN, LA MUTINERIE DE LA COURTINE:
LES RtGIMENTS RussEs RgVOLT S EN 1917 AU CENTRE DE LA FRANCE 149-51 (1938)-
goes on to describe the events of September 17-19, 1917 in the same images of road
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For a few hours, the road necessary for all communication and
travel was clogged with the thousand newly wild horses, before they
could be "collected and put out to pasture by the French. [Then
t]he artillery began again." 17 The interruption of the guns, the
irregularity in the rhythm of the noise, is the acoustical signature of
the soldiers' will, the audible registration of the sheer materiality of
men and horses running beneath and controlling the gunshot fire
above. It is one of many volatile events from the 1917 mutinies in
France, a narrative of "avalanching" soldiers' strikes reconstructed
in the diaries and speeches of military and political leaders: "The
troops refuse to go into the trenches," reported Colonel Herbillon,
a military-liaison officer to the government, "order is menaced
everywhere. [The] fever is extending itself."' B.H. Liddell Hart
wrote that "cases of desertion in the French Army rose from 509 in
1914 to 21,174 in 1917. "19 There were mutinies in sixteen differ-
ent corps, "and in places the trenches were scarcely even guard-
ed."
20
Germany had a shadow analogue in the naval rebellion of 1918
and the earlier mutinies in Kiel and in Wilhelmshaven. 21 What
began with the refusal of the German fleet to be ordered out against
the British quickly spread and became, according to Liddell Hart,
clogging, though soon it is between 6,000 and 7,500 men rather than horses:
This release of horses was only the beginning and at two o'clock the
rebels having gathered in the barracks of Laval emerged with their
belongings, without arms, and formed groups of four waving little white
flags. The movement of surrender had begun. The vast majority of the
troupe, despite the dictates of the ultimatum, headed for La Courtine, by
a small road that led to the church, next to which was the command post of
the French general staff.... The total number of submissions reached
almost 7500 men. Some came on foot, others in vans, in wagons, carts, on
horseback, etc., all without arms.... Despite the congestion produced at
the same place by the traffic of thousands of soldiers ....
Id. at 149-51 (translated from the French). (I am grateful to D.A. Miller for providing
an English translation of this passage, as well as of passages cited in notes 18, 26, 34,
& 35.)
17 R. WATT, supra note 16, at 275.
18 R. POINCARA, 9 Au SERVICE DE LA FRANCE: NEUF ANN9ES DE SOUVENIRS 153
(1932) (from the memoirs of Raymond Poincar6; the original French reads: "Des
hommes ont refus6 d'aller aux tranch~es. L'ordre est menac6 partout. La fizvre
s'6tend."). Continuing the metaphor of bodily disablement, Poincar6 asked, "Will
we need to wait for a new Marne victory to be cured?" Id. (translated from the
French).
19 B.H. LIDDELL HART, HISTORY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 302 (1972).
20 Id.
21 See D. DAHNHARDT, REVOLUTION IN KIEL 48, 50-54 (1978).
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"the uprising of the German people against the leaders who had led
them into disaster."22 And among British troops, strikes, resis-
tance, and marches of protest occurred in 1919 in Folkestone,
Dover, Kent, London, Sussex, Hampshire, West Country, Salisbury
Plain, Wales, Scotland, Canada, France, and (more mildly) India.
23
The soldiers, wanting to be demobilized, refused to carry out what
they correctly perceived to be Churchill's next plan, the invasion of
Russia to support the Whites against the Bolsheviks.
24
Like the wild horses on the La Courtine road, civilians and
soldiers periodically obstruct the road to war, interrupt it, clog it,
even bring it to a close.25 These historical instances of obstruc-
tion, both at the threshold of war (United States draft resistance in
1812, the Civil War, and the Vietnam War) and at the interior of
war (World War I in France, Germany, and Britain) 26 are recited
22 B.H. LIDDELL HART, supra note 19, at 379.
23 See A. ROTHSTEIN, THE SOLDIERS' STRIKES OF 1919, at 37-85 (1980).
24 See id. at 39.
25 The phenomenon of "clogging" in both war-making and law-making is
elaborated later in the Article. See infra notes 118-35, 161-93 and accompanying text.
26 The power of dissenting soldiers at the interior of war is equally visible in wars
of the present decade. The defeat of Iran in a series of battles in the Iran-Iraq War,
for example, has recently been attributed to the disenchantment of Iranian soldiers:
According to numerous observers, it is this demoralization of the pasdarans
and the bassidjis (volunteers) that is responsible for the defeats, otherwise
inexplicable, at Fao, Chalamcheh and Majnoun, more than the Iraqis' now
systematic use of chemical warfare. The latter in any case constituted an
additional subject of recrimination against those in power, who 'had taken
no precautions to protect us from these deadly weapons'.... Little by little, the
fronts came undone, despite the appeals of the authorities, which now fell
on deaf ears. A campaign for the enlisting of volunteers, launched with
great media support after the loss of Chalamcheh, managed, it is said, only
to recruit... 250 volunteers in Teheran.
Gueyras, La col/re despasdarans, Le Monde, Aug. 21-22, 1988, at 1, col. 1, & 5, col. 1
(translated from the French).
Soldiers' strikes, acts of desertion, and disobedience also played a stunning role
in the 1989-90 revolutions in Europe. The East Germany Army, once renown for its
discipline and training, was drastically reduced by desertions which took place
between November and March. Its size fell by almost half, from 173,000 to 90,000;
remaining soldiers sometimes expressed reluctance to participate in ordinary activities
such as the military exercises carried out by Soviet troops. See E. Germans Deserting
Newsday, Mar. 1, 1990, at 12; Int'l Herald Tribune, Mar. 1, 1990, at 1, col. 2;
Trumbull, News Currents, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 1, 1990, at 2, col. 1. In late
December, Romanian soldiers took the side of the population it had been ordered to
suppress and in doing so brought about the fall of Ceausescu. At the end of March,
after the Soviet Army in Lithuania had received "permission to use violence" against
the population, almost two thousand Lithuanian soldiers deserted, formally
registering their names at the parliament building in Vilnius. See Lieven & Dejevsky,
Vilnius Anger Over Seizure of Deserters, The Times [London], Mar. 28, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
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here not to portray conventional troops as primarily mutinous. On
the contrary, the United States did pass over the threshold into the
War of 1812, the Civil War, and the Vietnam War. France,
Germany, and Britain, along with other countries, did over
countless weeks, days, and years sustain the interior of World War
I. But they did so only with the assistance of their populations.
The photographic negatives make it clear that without that willing
fighting, the war cannot be fought.
Military leaders, by their constant insistence on the strategic
primacy of "morale," have always acknowledged their absolute
dependence on the consent of the soldiers. 27 Civilian leaders, too,
have recorded that dependence. Churchill, writing to Lloyd George
of his desire to carry out the 1919 "intervention" in Russia,
continued: "[B]ut unfortunately we have not the power-our orders
would not be obeyed, I regret to say."28 Similarly, in response to
the French mutinies in 1917, the leadership of France acknowledged
that the war was becoming unfightable: "[T]here had never been
anything like May 201 We seemed absolutely powerless. From every
section of the front the news arrived of regiments refusing to man
the trenches." 29 The War Memoirs of Lloyd George record the
early May conference between P6tain and himself during which
Lloyd George expressed his recognition that French fighting power
had become stalled not by a disability but by a refusal: "No, General
... with your record I could not make this mistake [of thinking you
can't fight], but I am certain that for some reason or other you won't
fight."30 Military leaders, civilian leaders, recruits, and soldiers
thus share the recognition that conventional wars are fought only
with the authorization of the population.
The constitutional protection of the population's direct
authorization of war is the subject of this Article. The kind of
consensual act Kant imagined-the deliberate assembling of the
representatives of the people for a voiced affirmation of war-is
provided for in the country's Social Contract in article I, section 8,
27 Regarding the stress on morale by military leaders, see E. SCARRY, THE BODY
IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 104-07, 153-57, 345-46 (1985).
28 M. GILBERT, 4 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL 235 (1975), cited in A. ROTHSTEIN, supra
note 23, at 95. For a discussion of the British soldiers' awareness of the plan, see id.
at 100.
29 B. SERRIGNY, TRENTE ANS AVEC PATAIN 146 (1959), cited in R. WATr, supra note
16, at 215.
30 D. LLOYD GEORGE, 4 WAR MEMOIRs 335 (1934), cited in R. WATT, supra note
16, at 218.
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which stipulates unequivocadly that Congress, not the President, has
the obligation to declare war. It might appear that the second,
Hobbesian form of consent would, in contrast, have no specifiable
doctrinal location in the Constitution. This second species of
consent appears to depend on the technical attributes of the guns
themselves: because they must be carried onto the field by persons,
the leaders must address the population and persuade them to carry
those guns. With nuclear weapons, this requirement disappears:
because there is no longer any need for the population to carry the
arms, there ceases to be the need to elicit the population's consent,
either at the opening of war or throughout its duration. Thus, the
ordinary features of argument and citizenry are no longer needed
or available.
While it might well have been the case that this second genre of
consent would be left unprotected by the Constitution, 3 this
Article argues that it is not the case. This critically important
31 The framers of the Constitution might well have assumed that this second form
of consent was protected by the material attributes of the guns themselves and
therefore needed no doctrinal protection. Both Hamilton and Madison, in fact,
argued that the unqualified concentration of military power in the hands of the
Executive (of the kind we now have in the provisions for presidential first-use) was
impossible because the need to amass that level of power also required the amassing
of persons who certainly would not permit it. Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 26,
argued: "An army, so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be
formed by progressive augmentations .... " THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 172 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Then follows a cascade of rhetorical questions:
Is it probable that such a [conspiracy between the legislature and Executive
to permit such a menace] would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be
persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations
in a representative body... ? Is it presumable... ? Can it be supposed
that there would not be found one man discerning enough to detect so
atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough... ?
Id. Were the Executive to concentrate this kind of power, wrote Hamilton, the
people would retract their consent and turn their backs on the state created; the
union would be dissolved, and a federalism would emerge so diverse it would give
way to anarchy. Then, at the end, he returns once more to the impossibility of it:
"But the question again recurs, upon what pretense could [the President] be put in
possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace?" Id. at 173. Madison, like
Hamilton, believed that this form of consent is protected by the technical attributes
of the arms themselves. His formulation of this argument in The Federalist No. 46 is
perhaps even more evocative of the present nuclear circumstances than is Hamilton's:
to imagine the endangering of government by a concentration of military power in
the Executive means imagining an Executive with a 'fixed plan for the extension of
the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States should
silently and patiently behold the gathering storm and continue to supply the materials
until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads." THE FEDERALIST NO. 46,
at 298-99 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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consensual requirement has its doctrinal location in the second
amendment. Both article I, section 8 and the second amendment
ensure the integrity of the social contract at the moment of entering
war; both protect against the concentration of military power in the
Executive; both are incompatible with our standing arrangements
for presidential first-use of nuclear weapons. The incompatibility
between a constitutionally mandated congressional declaration of
war and the country's longstanding nuclear arms policy is not the
subject of the present article because it already has a sturdy place
within arguments about nuclear weapons. It has been the subject
of articles within both nuclear discourse and legal discourse.32 In
addition, those arguments have begun to enter into the formulation
of cases that are now going into court to oppose presidential first-
use of nuclear weapons."5 The focus of this Article is instead the
12 For an argument about the incompatibility between art. I, § 8, cl. II and
presidential first-use, see Stone, Presidential First Use is Unlawful 56 FOREIGN POL'Y
94 (1984); see also F. WORMUTH, E. FIRMAGE, & F. BUTLER, To CHAIN THE DOG OF
WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 267-77 (1986); Cox,
Raison d'Etat and World Survival: Who Constitutionally Makes Nuclear War?, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1614 (1989); Forrester, Presidential Wars in the Nuclear Age: An
Unresolved Problem, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1636 (1989); Goldstein, The Failure of
Constitutional Controls Over War Powers in the Nuclear Age: The Argument for a
Constitutional Amendmen 40 STAN. L. REV. 1543 (1988).
" In 1987, two congressmen challenged presidential first-use in court. See
Transcript of Proceedings at 8, Dellums v. Reagan, No. c-87-2587-JPV (N.D. Cal. Nov.
19, 1987) (holding that plaintiffs' claims were not yet ripe for decision, but
acknowledging that "[p]laintiffs may have raised a new question that will require the
attention of the United States Supreme Court, because of the uniqueness of the fact
situation here"). Rather than appealing this ruling, the plaintiffs decided to wait for
a reformulation of the case involving the participation of a larger number of senators
and representatives.
The defendant in such a case may be the President alone or may instead be the
President and others in a first-use position, such as those in the line of presidential
succession as specified in the 1976 congressional hearings on first-use. See Hearings:
First Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 8, at 39, 79, 94, 128, 213, 215 (describing
scenarios in which persons other than the President might be in first-use positions).
Testimony during those hearings suggested that the captains of the U.S. strategic
submarines are also in first-use positions. Id. at 76, 77, 215. The gravity of this
constitutional anomaly surrounding 35 unelected strategic submarine commanders
was not addressed by the press and public in the decade following the 1976 hearings.
In the last three years, however, it has begun to emerge into public view. See Miller,
Who Needs PALs, in PROCEEDINGS: U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE 50-56 (July 1988); Moss,
WaterBombs, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 3,1988, at 20; Hampshire, Engaged Philosopher,
New York Review of Books, Feb. 2, 1989, at 7; Scarry, A Nuclear Sub Accident Waiting
to Happen, Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 6, 1988, at 9-E, col. 1. Attention to the issue was in
part prompted by a 1987 study by Peter Stein and Peter Feaver documenting the
absence of locks on submarine-carried nuclear weapons. See P. STEIN & P. FEAVER,
ASSURING CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE EVOLUTION OF PERMISSIVE ACTION
1991] 1267
1268 UNIVERSITYOFPENSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 139:1257
way the second amendment supplements and reinforces article I,
section 8 in the arguments against the United States strategic policy
of presidential first-use.
I. THE RIGHT TO BEAR AlmS: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT DISTRIBUTION
The second amendment, the right to bear arms, tends to enter
our consciousness through claims about why criminals should be
allowed to walk around with pistols. Alternatively, it emerges there
through arguments made by gun clubs or even neighborhood watch
groups who urge that there should be no state laws preventing us
from carrying guns for hunting, for recreation, or for self-protection
against the criminals carrying pistols.
But the second amendment is a very great amendment, and
coming to know it through criminals and the endlessly disputed
claims of gun clubs seems the equivalent of our coming to know the
first amendment only through pornography. Freedom of speech
may or may not protect pornography; but it would be difficult,
probably impossible, to infer the monumental scale and solidity of
that amendment from this one solitary inflection in its surface. The
same is true of the right to bear arms. The history of its formula-
tion and invocation makes clear that whatever its relation to the
realm of individuals and the private uses they have devised for
guns,3 4 the amendment came into being primarily as a way of
LINKS 72-89, 99-103 (1987).
In addition to cases about presidential first-use, art. I, § 8 has been the
constitutional basis of cases about nuclear weapons unconnected to presidential action,
such as the sequence of lawsuits about accidental computer launch brought by
CliffordJohnson. SeeJohnson v. Weinberger, 851 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1988);Johnson
v. Chain, No. 89-20265-sw (N.D.Cal. 1990);Johnson v. Weinberger, No. c-86-3334-sw
(N.D.Cal. 1986). Also, either art. I, § 8 or the War Powers Resolution has been at the
center of congressional lawsuits against presidents acting with conventional troops,
such as in Iraq, see Dellums v. Bush, No. 90-2866 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1990); in the
Persian Gulf, see Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987); in Grenada, see
Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F.Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984); in Nicaragua, see Sanchez-Espinoza
v. Reagan, 568 F.Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983); and in El Salvador, see Crockett v. Reagan,
558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).
' The second amendment cannot be categorically separated from the pleasures
of hunting since the European and American history of that pleasure is itself
entwined with issues ofdistributivejustice. The conflation was visible, for example,
during the French Revolution. In August of 1789, the majority in the General
Assembly voted for a decree abolishing "the exclusive right of dovecotes and pigeon
houses .... Pigeons will be encaged at times determined by the communities, and
during this time, they will be regarded as game. Everyone will have the right to kill
them." Winock, Chronique de 1789: L'annie sans pareill, Le Monde, Aug. 16, 1988,
at 2, col. 1 (tranlated from the French). The decree, according to Mirabeau, asserted
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dispersing military power across the entire population. Like voting,
like reapportionment, like taxation, what is at stake in the right to
bear arms is a just distribution of political power.
When I speak here about a distribution of arms, what I mean is a
distribution of authorization over our nation's arms. It is crucial to
understand that the argument that follows about distributing arms
does not express a hope that we can all have guns. It is rather to
say that if as a nation-state we are to have injuring power, the
authorization over the action of injuring (as well as over the risk of
receiving injury in return) must be dispersed throughout the
population in the widest possible way. How much injuring power the
country should have is a wholly separate subject. Some believe we
should have none; many believe we should have a great deal. The
argument here does not touch that question; it is prior to it.
3 5
the principle of equality: "Every man has the right to hunt on his land, none has the
right to hunt on someone else's land: this principle is as sacred for the monarch as
for anybody else." Id. (translated from the French). The conflation of the personal
right to hunt with the political right of arms also occurred in the United States. A
proposed constitutional amendment emerging from the Pennsylvania ratification
assembly included a provision asserting the people's "right to bear arms for the
defence of themselves and their own State or the United States, or for the purpose
of killing game." B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 665
(1975). The perception of intimacy continued into the nineteenth centuryin military
tracts. William Sumner, for example, speaks of shooting game as a way the
population remains limber in the use of its arms. See An Inquihy Into the Importance
of the Militia to a Free Commonwealth, in A Letter from William H. Sumner, Adjutant
General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, toJohn Adams, Late President of
the United States; with his Answer, in ANGLO-AMERICAN ANTIMILITARY TRACTS 1697-
1830, at 39-40 (R. Kohn ed. 1979) [hereinafter An Inquiy Into the Importance of the
Militia]. Legal theorists in both the United States and Britain recognized the
implications of hunting laws. "Blackstone," wrote William Rawle, saw "that the
prevention of popular insurrections and resistance to government by disarming the
people, is oftener meant than avowed by the makers of forest and game laws." W.
RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 122-23
(1825) (citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *412).
35 Because the right to bear arms is prior to such questions, revolutionaries have
made it their first demand whether they were militarist or pacifist. During the first
General Assembly in the French Revolution, Mirabeau argued that "it is impossible
to imagine an aristocracy more frightening than that which is established in a state
by the mere fact that one group of citizens would be armed and the other would not
be." Meeting, Aug. 18,1789, VIII ARCH. PARL. 455 (translated from the French), cited
in D. Conrad, Gandhi's Conception of Human Rights, Civil Disobedience as
Satyagraha, and Constitutional Legality 140 n.48 (unpublished manuscript on file with
author). India presented a list of eleven demands to Great Britain, the eleventh
requiring the rearming of the population. Gandhi argued that the population would
decide whether or not to use its weapons only after those weapons had been restored.
Id. at 139. He wrote: "Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history
will look upon the Act depriving a whole nation of arms as the blackest." 2 M.
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However much injuring power we have, like all other forms of
political access, it must be Spread throughout our entire numerical
expanse.
Only four Supreme Court rulings have centered upon the
second amendment, three in the nineteenth century and one in the
twentieth.A6 Those rulings are not incompatible with an interpre-
tation emphasizing distributive justice, since they together stress
collective rather than exclusively individual rights, and military
responsibilities rather than recreational uses. But the cases are
muddled. The country stands in need of a major Supreme Court
reinterpretation of the second amendment. 37 If the Court were to
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(M. Desai trans. 1927). The issue of arms distribution also became a focus in the
pacific revolution in East Germany when on December 14, 1989, the Parliament
"decided to do away with the right of communist party authorities to possess or carry
firearms," thereby ending the formal inequality of arms that had given the SED
leadership access to the weapons from which the population itself was legally barred.
Marion, Les autoritds judiciaires doivent convaincre l'opinion de leur dltermination, Le
Monde, Dec. 14, 1989, at 5, col. 3.
36 See United States v. Miller, '307 U.S. 174 (1939); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535
(1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1876). For an analysis of the consistent emphasis in these decisions on the
second amendment as a collective, rather than an individual, right, see Weatherup,
Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendmen 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 995-1000 (1975), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
130, 164, 166 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT ON SECOND AMEND-
MENT]. Don B. Kates,Jr. points out that the 1939 case is the Supreme Court's "first
and last extended treatment of the second amendment," but he adds to the
nineteenth century list two cases in which the amendment figures more tangentially
than in those cited above: Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), and Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). See Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning
of the Second Amendment 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 246-50 (1983). Kates provides strong
arguments for the individual interpretation; but, more crucially, he points out the
"false dichotomy between the exclusively state's right and the unrestricted individual
right interpretations" that have inappropriately absorbed legal commentary. Id. at
273. "In fact," he adds, "the arms of the state's militias were and are the personally
owned arms of the general citizenry, so that the amendment's dual intention to
protect both was achieved by guaranteeing to the citizenry a right to possess arms
individually." Id. On the confusion of individual and collective rights, see infra note
109 and accompanying text.
37 The call for a Supreme Court reinterpretation, implicit in the many article's
observing the small number of cases, is sometimes explicit, as when David Hardy
wrote: "The formation ofjurisprudence of the Second Amendment is nearly two
centuries overdue." Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward aJurisprudence of
the Second Amendmen4 9 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 638 (1986). Similarly, Sanford
Levinson wrote: "The Supreme Court has almost shamelessly refused to discuss the
issue ... ." Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment 99 YALE L.J. 637, 654
(1989). Levinson also observed that both liberals and the legal academy continue to
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follow a distributive interpretation, its reading would be supported
by the key attributes of the right to bear arms. Each of these basic
attributes in isolation illuminates the contemporary problem of
arms. Together, they display an unexpected portrait of the deep
structure underlying "contract" and "force." That structure,
gradually emerging in the present section of this Article, will be
unfolded in the final section. It will in the end become clear why
illegal authorization of nuclear weapon use is not a simple constitu-
tional misdemeanor, but a constitutional deformation of the most
serious kind.
A. Distribution, Ratification, and the Bill of Rights
The first argument centers on theform rather than content of the
right to bear arms. The first ten amendments came into being
through the agency of distribution. They came into being not at the
federal Constitutional Convention itself, but out of the ratification
proceedings, the centrifugal period during which there was
dispersed out to the population for its confirmation the proposed
constitution, itself only a "proposal,"3 8 a recommendation, or (as
it was called during the Virginia Convention) "that paper on the
desk over there."
3 9
In the records of the ratification debates, the Constitution is
again and again talked about within the framework of explicit
arguments about what it means "to consent," "to contract," "to
compact," or "to make a social contract."40 Most important, the
ignore the amendment at their peril, and he urged that "serious, engaged discussion"
begin. Id. at 656-59.
38 For the designation of the Constitution as "a proposal of a contract" or as "the
proposed contract," see infra note 40.
SSuppose, said Mr. Pendleton during the opening of the Virginia debate, "the
paper on your table dropped from one of the planets; the people found it, and sent
us here to consider whether it was proper for their adoption." 3 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, TOGETHER
WITH THEJOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, LUTHER MARTIN'S LETTER, YATE'S
MINUTES, CONGRESSIONAL OPINIONS, VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF '98-
'99, AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONSTrrUTION 38 (J. Elliot ed. 1861)
[hereinafter RATIFICATION DEBATES]. As in the opening hours of the debate, so in
the closing- Madison referred to those who wrote the Constitution at the federal
assembly as "those who prepared the paper on the table," id. at 618, and Mr.
Harrison led into his summary of his vote by asking- "How comes that paper on your
table to be now here discussed?" Id. at 628. For the constant designation of the
Constitution as "that paper," see infra notes 180-183 and accompanying text.
0 The use of these words is explicit and self-conscious, as when Patrick Henry
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ratification itself is the performative action of consent. The Virginia
instruments of ratification, for example, sweep through a two
paragraph preamble asserting the knowledge, freedom, and
deliberation with which the action of the third paragraph is
performed, that third paragraph reading:
We, the said delegates, in the name and behalf of the people of
Virginia, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the Constitution,
recommended on the seventeenth day of September, one thousand
seven hundred and eighty-seven, by the federal Convention, for
the government of the United States; hereby announcing to all
those whom it may concern, that the said Constitution is binding
upon the said people, according to an authentic copy hereto
annexed, in the words following.
41
The resolution of South Carolina, shorn of all preambles, reads
more simply: "Resolved, That this Convention do assent to and
ratify the Constitution agreed to on the 17th day of September last,
by the Convention of the United States of America, held at
Philadelphia."42 Only relatively brief records of the South Caroli-
asked, "Have they said, We, the states? Have they made a proposal of a compact
between states? ... Is this a monarchy, like England-a compact between prince and
people?" Elliot, 3 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 39, at 44. Henry also asked
what it would mean to be ruled, regulated, or taxed "not by your own consent, but
by people who have no connection with you." Id. at 56. Whether or not Patrick
Henry at any given moment overtly uses the word "compact" or "contract," his
arguments and comments at the Virginia Ratification Debate collectively constitute
a brilliant treatise on social contract or, more precisely, on the phenomenology of the
action of contracting.
The explicit language of contract is also, of course, used by many others, as when
Mr. Grayson, stressing the assembly's freedom to reject the proposed contract,
observed: "In all parts of the world there is a reciprocity in contracts and compacts.
If one man makes a proposition to another, is he bound to accept it?" Id. at 614.
The language of contract similarly was employed when Mr. Nicholas concluded his
comments on amendment by saying: "If thirteen individuals are about to make a
contract, and one agrees to it, but at the same time declares that he understands its
meaning... (what the words of the contract plainly and obviously denote) .... " Id.
at 626. Almost all the participants spoke about the action of making a country, as
when Mr. ZachariahJohnson described the "happy operation [of government] when
[it is]judiciously constructed," id. at 644; when Mr. Tyler observed that "[w]e are not
passing laws now, but laying the foundation on which laws are to be made," id. at 641;
and when Mr. Nicholas discussed how varying forms of ratification affect the
"binding" character of the compact. Id. at 626.
41 Id. at 656.
42 4 id. at 338.
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na Assembly exist.43 Generally speaking, consent-whether exer-
cised in the spheres of political, marital, or medical contract
making-has a tonal range that extends from acquiescence and the
privative, on the one hand, to eager affirmation and expansive
largesse on the other. The latter, the complete merging of
obligation and desire, becomes audible in the reaction to the South
Carolina vote. There had been, according to Elliot's sources, a
motion to delay the South Carolina vote until Virginia came in with
its vote, but the motion was rejected: "The rejection of it was
considered as decisive in favor of the constitution. When the result
of the vote was announced, an event unexampled in the annals of
Carolina took place. Strong and involuntary expressions of
applause and joy burst forth from the numerous transported
spectators."
44
This transformation of a speculative recommendation into
"binding law" occurs through the instrumentation of ratification; it
is only this that gives it the weight and authority of the material
world. As Akhil Amar wrote, "The Constitution is our supreme law,
superior to ordinary legislation, simply because its source was the
supreme lawmaker, superior to ordinary legislatures: 'We the
People of the United States.'" 45 The most eloquent testimony to
the distributive element in the right to bear arms is the fact that it
came into being, along with the other nine amendments, during the
43 In Jonathan Elliot's five-volume set, South Carolina occupies ninety pages, see
id. at 253-342, whereas the ever articulate Virginia takes up an entire seven-hundred
page volume. See 3 id.
4 4 D. RAMSAY, 2 THE HISTORY OF SOUTH-CAROLINA FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT
IN 1670, TO THE YEAR 1808, at 432 (1809). At moments, the performance of the
consensual action overflowed the formal site of the ratification assemblies. In New
York, Antifederalistsjoined "jubilant" Federalists in taverns to celebrate the news of
the Virginia ratification: according to John Jay, "the two parties mingled at each
table, and the toasts (of which each had copies) were communicated by the sound of
drum and accompanied by the discharge of cannon." R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 175 (1955) (quoting letter from John Jay to Mrs. Jay
(July 5, 1788), reprinted in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OFJOHNJAY
1782-1793, at 347-48 (H. Johnston ed. 1970)).
45 Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment 97 YALE L.J. 281,286
(1987) (invoking the description of ratification in THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); id. No. 40, at 253 (j. Madison)); see also Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REv.
1043, 1094 (1988) [hereinafter Philadelphia Revisited] (arguing that the ratification
conventions have a greater claim to being "the people" than has the Congressional
Assembly because of the smaller influence of agency costs in the ratification
conventions and because the delegate selection process of the conventions focused
only on ratification and not on a "bundle" of oddly assorted issues).
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actualization process. Such actualization was acquired from sheer
proximity to so many persons willing, by their endorsement, to lend
the paper some of their own material form. In effect, they
endorsed the contract in exchange for an alteration in the contract-
the promise of appended amendments. Roy Weatherup wrote:
There might never have been a federal Bill of Rights had it not
been for one alarming event that is almost forgotten today. As part
of the price of ratification in New York, it was agreed unanimously
that a second federal convention should be called by the states, in
accordance with Article V of the Constitution, to revise the
document. Governor Clinton wrote a circular letter making this
proposal to the governors of all the states.
4 6
Rather than put the entire Constitution at risk by a reconsideration,
Madison and the Federalists agreed to the addition of amendments.
New York was successful because other state assemblies had
already voiced strong reservations by attaching proposed "rights"
amendments to their articles of ratification. But New York's role
was decisive and had been foreseen (even in the midst of the
federal convention) by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts. Gerry, a
tireless opponent of a centralized military, warned in August of
1787 that the proposed Constitution lacked a sufficient "check"
against a standing army in time of peace, and that there would be
great opposition on this basis.4 7 "He suspected," Madison wrote
of Gerry in his convention notes,
that preparations of force were now making against it. (He
seemed to allude to the activity of the governor of New York at
this crisis in disciplining the militia of that state.) He thought an
army dangerous in time of peace, and could never consent to a
power to keep up an indefinite number.4 8
4 6 
SENATE REPORT ON SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 36, at 163. For Governor
Clinton's letter, see 2 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 39, at 413-14; see also M.
JENSEN, THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 138-50 (1964) (describing the
use of the New York circular letter within the ratification process and adoption of the
Bill of Rights).
4 7 A. PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: A REARRANGEMENT OF
MADISON'S NOTES GIVING CONSECUTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF PROVISIONS IN THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, SUPPLEMENTED BY DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION AND TO RATIFICATION PROCESSES, AND INCLUDING
INSERTIONS BY THE COMPILER 515 (:194 1) [hereinafter MADISON REARRANGED]; see also
id. at 519, 736 (noting Gerry's opposition to the centralization of the military).
48 Id. at 515.
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During the New York convention in the summer months of 1788,
Madison wrote letters to Edmund Randolph expressing his anxiety
about the outcome, and on July 16, acknowledging that ratification
was uncertain, added, "The best informed apprehend some clog that
will amount to a condition."49 That clog or condition became the
Bill of Rights. In the end, New York changed the wording from "on
condition" that an amendment convention be called to the words
"in full confidence" that an amendment convention will be
called. 50 They were right.
The fact that the right to bear arms gained constitutional
standing through the agency of the ratification debates is critically
important because, as will become clear below, the amendment
replicates three attributes of the ratification process: first, its
function as a distributional mechanism; second, the immediacy and
self-consciousness of the contracting action; third, the role played
in the work of validation by the phenomenon of "materiality" or (in
Madison's idiom) "clogging." The first of the three will be quickly
sketched here, then elaborated along with the other two in the
analysis of the second amendment that follows.
It may seem only a pleasurable coincidence that a distributional
mechanism (the second amendment) should arise out of a distribu-
tional process (the ratification debates). But the gravity of this
circularity soon becomes apparent. As a group, the first ten
amendments are increasingly recognized as sponsoring "collective"
rather than narrowly individual rights, not only because they ensure
the population's ongoing access to procedural gates of consent such
as assembly, jury, and open press, but because they in turn sponsor
later revisions in the Constitution (such as the thirteenth, four-
teenth, and fifteenth amendments). These revisions in turn sponsor
still later revisions: large parts of twentieth century law, various
legal commentators have observed, can be seen as elaborations of
the Reconstruction amendments. 51 The gradual extension of the
49 Letter fromJames Madison to Edmund Randolph (July 16, 1788), reprinted in
5 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 39, at 573.
5 See 2 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 39, at 412.
51 Perhaps the most adventuresome or unrestrained articulation of this idea is
made by William E. Nelson who, in a standard reference work, states that a single
sentence within the fourteenth amendment-"('No state shall make ... .')-has
become the text upon which most twentieth-century constitutional law is a gloss."
Nelson, Fourteenth Amendment (Framing), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 757 (L. Levy, K. Karst, & D. Mahoney eds. 1986).
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original contract to those large parts of the population (blacks and
women) not included in its 1789 provisions occurs through the
mediation of the amendments. The distributional work of the first
ten amendments is, then, twofold: they multiply the number of
consensual gates (assembly, jury, free press, arms) available to the
limited population (white male) already included within the 1789
Constitution; they also vastly multiply over time the scale of the
population that will eventually have access to those multiplied
consensual gates.
Underlying contract theory is a persistent question about the
temporal duration of the act of consent: should consent be
imagined as a single event that, once having occurred, cannot be
retracted in the future? Or is it instead the case that consent is
ongoing and can be withdrawn at any time, at once dissolving the
contract? This distinction between what can be called "threshold
consent" and "perpetual consent" is fundamental to all species of
contract: social contract, medical contract, marital contract, etc.
52
Other writers, even if more cautious, are also tempted into comprehensive
statements. Coupling the fourteenth amendment's "equal protection" with the first
amendment's "freedom of expression," Michael J. Perry asserts that the "two
categories are, by consensus, among the most important in the whole corpus of
constitutional law. The third category ["substantive due process"] is, again by
consensus, the most controversial." M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POUCY-
MAKING BYTHEJUDICIARY 5 (1982). Ward E.Y. Elliot writes: "[W]hile nobody actually
said that they understood the Fourteenth Amendment to be a blank check to
posterity, the framers and the members of the state legislatures who ratified the
amendment might not have been :hocked to find language like 'equal protection,'
'due process,' and 'privileges and immunities' extended to deal with problems like
wiretapping, which they were in no position to anticipate." W. ELLIOT, THE RISE OF
GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE IN VOTING RIGHTS DISPUTES,
1845-1961, at 60 (1974).
52 Within social contract theory, whether a particular speaker endorses or instead
disdains revolution often turns on whether the person believes consent is a perpetual
act or instead a solitary act performed (and afterwards relinquished) at the threshold.
Sometimes political philosophers acknowledge the existence of both forms and give
them separate names. For example, Patrick Atiyah identifies the "promise" as a
subspecies of consent, in which, at a single decisive moment, there is a willed
abdication of the power of successive revision normally operating in consent. See P.
ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 177 (1981). Locke differentiates "express
consent" from "tacit consent" on this basis. The first occurs in a decisive moment
and is not revocable; here, the obligation incurred, rather than the action performed,
becomes "perpetual." The second is open, iterative, revocable; it can be withdrawn
at any time. SeeJ. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 65. Within marriage law, whether a given
civil or religious institution prohibits or instead sanctions separation and divorce
turns on whether the consent of bride and bridegroom is seen as an exclusively
threshold act (that once given, cannot then be retracted) or instead as perpetual
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It provides the language for appreciating what is at stake in the
apparently "circular" phenomenon in which the ratification (the
moment of distributing the contract to "the population" for its
approval) gives rise to the amendments (themselves the agents of
the Constitution's eventual distribution to the entire population).
In effect, the participants in the ratification debates settled the
question of whether the parties to this contract would exercise
"threshold consent" or instead "perpetual consent" by using the
great, solitary "threshold" moment to revise the Constitution in such
a way that the gateways become "perpetual." The Federal Assembly
had already built into the Constitution the possibility of perpetual
consent in the article V provisions for amendment. But the
ratifiers, in effect, made the immediate application of article V a
precondition for their own validation of article V and the contract's
other four articles. By specifying a series of materialized loci, they
gave the practice of perpetual consent a material shape and a
locatable form-newspapers, jury box, assembly hall, and (as will
become clear) arms.
If the amendments as a group are "distributive" in their general
character, 53 the second amendment is so specifically. 54  The
(consent is each day renewed; it may therefore also be retracted). Within United
States medicine, ethical norms in therapeutic practice and in experimental research
are distinguishable by the much greater emphasis in the second on consent as
ongoing. The 1947 Nuremberg Code, the 1975 Declaration of Helsinki, as well as
state codes (such as the California Act on the Protection of Human Subjects in
Medical Experiments), all overtly state as a central thesis the ongoing and revisionary
nature of consent. "He or she should be informed that he or she is at liberty to
abstain from participation in the study and that he or she is free to withdraw his or
her consent to participate at any time." Declaration of Helsinki, Principle 9, reprinted
in LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE 928 (J. Areen, P. King, S. Goldberg, & A. Capron
eds. 1984). For all three codes, see id. at 925-26, 927-29, 972. In a hospital stay, in
contrast, patients are ordinarily not told that their consent is ongoing, that the food
and the medicines they are handed are (like the operations they undergo) subject to
their consent, and that they may change their minds about a plan of treatment to
which they have previously agreed.
" In general, the decentering of power at the ratification conventions, rather than
opposing the centralizing tendency of the Constitutional Convention, can be seen as
extending the distribution of power occurring there through the "separation of
powers" doctrine. The idiom of "checks and balances" expresses distribution in a
defensive or negative language, the withholding of all power from any one location.
But this can alternatively be phrased in the positive as a dispersal of power across all
locations. The language of "distribution" is used by Hamilton, who speaks of checks
and balances as "[t]he regular distribution of power into distinct departments." THE
FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). So, too, it is a natural
mental habit for Madison to go from "separation of powers" to the image of people
as a whole. Thus, in his February 6, 1792 article in The National Gazette, he writes,
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repeated call for the decentering of military power at the ratifica-
tion conventions was, in its overt phrasing, consciously poised
against the centrist habits of the Constitutional Assembly. But in
fact the amendment works to amplify, rather than to contradict, the
dispersal of military power that had already occurred at the center.
What is remarkable is that the two sites of contract-making-the
Federal Assembly and the ratification assemblies-each in their
separate decisions on the military, chose the largest possible unit of
people to oversee questions of war. During the Federal Assembly's
deliberations on article I, section 8, the power to declare war-what
Joseph Story would one day call "the highest act of legislation"55 -
was explicitly withheld from the President as well as from either the
House or the Senate acting alone; it was given instead to the full
Congress, the largest pool of persons among the three federal
branches.5 6 Again, during the deliberations of the ratification
assemblies, the insistent call for a "right to bear arms" amendment
envisioned military responsibility dispersed across the entire
population. At each site, a decision was made that war must be
overseen by a group whose size was the largest possible and,
perhaps even more striking, whose size was coterminous with the
"In bestowing the eulogies due to the particular and internal checks of power, it
ought not the less to be remembered, that they are neither the sole nor the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty. The people who are authors of this blessing, must
also be its guardians." Madison, Government of the United States, reprinted in THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND His PRIVATE
CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NUMEROUs LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS Now FOR THE
FIRST TIME PRINTED 93 (G. Hunt ed. 1906). On the "separation of powers" doctrine
as a distributive mechanism, see Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425 (1987). Akhil Amar has analyzed the "majoritarian," "structural," and
"educational" characteristics of the Bill of Rights that have been obscured by what
Amar described as a "clause-bound approach" to "constitutional discourse." Amar,
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1201-10 (1991).
54 It is appropriate that the second amendment was, as Hardy observed, "one of
the least controversial" and, thus, one of the most consensual of the ten amendments.
See Hardy, supra note 37, at 606.
55 2 J. STORY, supra note 5, at 87.
56 This constitutional requirement of declaration by the full bicameral assembly
strongly suggests that the policy of presidential first-use cannot be remedied by giving
the decision to a congressional committee, or to "sample" members of each house,
or to a council of state chosen by Congress, as several authors have recommended.
See Cox, supra note 32, at 1633; Forrester, supra note 32, at 1641; Goldstein, supra
note 32, at 1587; Stone, supra note 32, at 107. For a more elaborate analysis, see
Banks, First Use of Nuclear Weapons: The Constitutional Role of a Congressional
Leadership Committee 13 J. LEGIS. 1 (1986). On the requirement of numerical
participation, both in Congress and in the population at large, see infra notes 118-35
and accompanying text.
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size of the deliberative body making the decision. The Constitution-
al Congress made the full Congress the arbiters of war; the Popular
Assemblies made the population the arbiters of war. None
disarmed themselves. To have done so would have been to dissolve
the capacity even to enter into the act of contract-making.
B. Distributive Inequities Dissolve the Contract
As this section will show, throughout the ratification period,
inequities of distribution in the nation's arms are described in the
idiom of military defeat. Because armed coercion and social
contract are understood as two antagonistic models, what is being
perceived in this inequity is not some local species of unfairness,
but a dissolution of the basic social contract itself.
The right to bear arms is widely recognized as going hand in
hand with the long standing distress over standing armies. The
pre-Revolutionary American arguments against the standing army-
as well as the longer tradition of British arguments-had as a single
goal their opposition to the concentration of the military power in
the hands of a monarch, president, or any other occupant of an
executive site. They were thus themselves distributive arguments,
urging a decentralization of the military by means of the militia. At
least seven of the states57 had constitutional provisions protecting
the militia and prohibiting (or advising against) a standing army.
When during the federal convention Madison identified "large
standing armies" as "the greatest danger to liberty,"" he was
echoing a long tradition which saw not foreign armies but inequities
in one's own military as subverting the social contract because they
slide the society back into the blur of pre-contractual coercion.
That backward slide is registered in the two recurring constructs of
"invasion" and "disarming."
An inequality of arms, a concentration in one location and an
absence in another, is described repeatedly in Anglo-American
17 These seven states are Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, New
York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 447
n.26 (H. Storing ed. 1981). For a contemporary argument that the state controlled
militia is a distributive mechanism designed to act as a "check on the abuse of military
power by the federal government," see Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666
F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn. 1987), afj'd, 880 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989), aftd, 110 S. Ct.
2418 (1990).
58 MADISON REARRANGED, supra note 47, at 524.
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history as a military defeat or "invasion." For example, a 1769
resolution of the Massachusetts House of Representatives held:
That the establishment of a standing army, in this colony, in a time
of peace, without the consent of the General Assembly of the same,
is an INVASION of the natural rights of the people, as well as of
those which they claim as free born Englishmen, confirmed by
magna charta, the bill of rights, as settled at the revolution, and
the charter of this province.
5 9
Benjamin Franklin one year later wrote to Samuel Cooper of the
possibility that the King will raise and quarter his army:
And while we continue so many distinct and separate States, our
having the same Head ... will not justify such an Invasion of the
Separate Right of each State to be consulted on the Establishment
of whatever Force is proposed to be kept up within its Limits, and
to give or refuse its Consen4 as shall appear most for the Public Good
of that State.
60
The inequalities that give rise to the conceptual geography of
invasion are not themselves always inequalities of physical force or
physical arms. One post-revolutionary tract arguing against
inheritable military titles-Cassius's 1783 Considerations on the Society
or Order of Cincinnati61-perceived the unequal distribution of
military honor among the revolutionary soldiers as leading to two
groups of citizens, the titled and the untitled (and implicitly, the
entitled and the unentitled). Can anyone believe, Cassius asked,
"that the remaining rights of the people which are yet left un-
59 Resolutions of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, June 29, 1769,
quoted inJ. REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAw: THE STANDING-ARMY CONTROvERsY, THE
Two CONsTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 166 (1981)
(italics added).
In the Second Treatise, Locke speaks of "invading" another's rights, as well of
"invading" the body and "invading" property which is an "annexation" to the body.
See J. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 10, 15-17, 115-16. When he uses the word for a
nonphysical object such as rights or freedom, he often includes the word "rapine" in
close proximity, as though to restore the physical referent. The population enters the
social contract for mutual security, to "secure them from injury and violence...
[which is] a trespass against the whole species." Id. at 10.
60 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Samuel Cooper (June 8, 1770), cited in J.
REID, supra note 59, at 171.
61 See Cassius, Considerations on the Society or Order of Cincinnati, Lately Instituted by
the Major-Generals, Brigadiers, and Other Officers of the American Army, Proving that it
Creates, A Race of Hereditaty Patricians, or Nobility, and Interspersed with Remarks on its
Consequences to the Freedom and Happiness of the Republick, in ANGLO-AMERICAN
ANTIMILITARY TRACTs 1697-1830, supra note 34 [hereinafter Order of Cincinnati].
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touched, will not be invaded and violated, by men, who [disdain] the
condition of private citizens... ?"62
The pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary charge of
"invasion" resurfaces continually during the ratification period.
Agrippa's 1788 letters in The Massachusetts Gazette, for example,
include among their proposed conditions for accepting the
Constitution an amendment ensuring each state's control of its own
militia and an amendment prohibiting invasion: "[N]o continental
army shall come within the limits of any state, other than garrison
to guard the publick stores, without the consent of such states in times
of peace." 63 Luther Martin's letters to The Maryland Journal argue
that if the central government's call to the militia is unmediated by
the authorizing "consent" of the states, the country will enter the
condition of "martial law" and freemen will enter the situation of
"slaves." 64  The palpable apprehension of "invasiveness"-the
trespass over the physical boundaries of the state, over the nation-
state, or instead over the physical boundaries of persons-is itself
memorialized in the progression of the amendments in the Bill of
Rights. After the second amendment's prohibition of an unequal
distribution of arms comes the third amendment's prohibition of
the nonconsensual entry of soldiers into houses, followed by the
fourth amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches and
seizures" of "persons, houses, papers, and effects."
65
The insistent appearance of the invasion idiom in both the
revolutionary and the ratification periods underscores the fact that
the "invading" army may belong to another nation or to one's own.
The unequal dispersal of military power-rather than the overt
spectacle of incoming soldiers-instigates the vision of contractual
collapse. As defeat follows invasion, so the spectre of "disarm-
ing"66 follows that of "invasion." The invocation of this second
62 Id. at 10. The importance of prohibiting titles in a distributive society is saluted
by Madison:
Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of
this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition
of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and
in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 242 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).63 Agrippa, XVIII, Mass. Gazette, no. 406, Feb. 5,1788, reprinted in P. FORD, ESSAYS
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY
THE PEOPLE 1787-1788, at 11-19 (1892) (emphasis added).
r Luther Martin, III, MarylandJ., no. 1021, Mar. 1788, reprinted in P. FORD, supra
note 63, at 358-59.
65 See U.S. CONST. amends. II, III & IV.
6The word "disarm" has the peculiarity of being, on the one hand, a neutral
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idiom displays the same clash of the literal and the metaphorical,
the same apprehensive conflation of foreign and domestic agents of
contractual subversion. The 1689 Declaration of Rights presented
to William and Mary, that later became the British Bill of Rights,
contained as its fifth and sixth charges againstJames II the assertion
that he had attempted "to subvert" the "[l]aws and [1]iberties" by
"raising and keeping a Standing army... in Time of Peace without
Consent of Parliament" and "[b]y causing several good Subjects,
being Protestants, to be disarmed at the same Time when Papists
were both armed and employed contrary to Law."67 The British
king, as Roy Weatherup stressed, "did not disarm Protestants in any
literal sense; the reference is to his desire to abandon the militia in
favor of a standing army and his replacement of Protestants by
Catholics at important military posts." 68  During the American
Constitutional Convention, Elbridge Gerry opposed the standing
army and national control of the militia on the grounds that they
approximated a "disarm[ing]" of the state citizenry and a shifting of
national structures toward a "system of Despotism."
69
The charge of disarming recurs constantly during the ratification
debates. The enslavement of the population that Luther Martin
envisioned in Maryland would come about, he argued, through the
standing army's attempts "to disarm" the militia."70  At the
Pennsylvania Ratification Committee, the minority report counsel-
ling against ratification attributed its dissent in part to the need for
a constitutional provision stipulating "no law shall be passed for
descriptive term registering the state of being deprived of one's arms and, on the
other hand, a concussive term within strategic writings, now most familiar to us in
Clausewitz's formulations, registering total defeat by the opponent. See K. VON
CLAUSEwrrz, ON WAR 5 (O.J.Jolles trans. 1943). As the quoted passages suggest, the
first (the deprivation of arms) is often referred to as though it were the second (total
subjugation), precisely because the first is perceived as inevitably entailing the second.
Or, phrased in the other direction, "disarm" in strategic writings can have the
resonance of total subjugation precisely because the apparently neutral deprivation
of arms always involves an open or obscure state of coercion. Logically, the neutral
action of "disarming" precedes the more inflammatory apprehension of "invasion"
which in turn precedes the strategic outcome of "disarming" as "defeating."
67 Weatherup, supra note 36, at 973 (quoting the Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., sess.2,
c. 2 (1689)). Cf. Hardy, supra note 37, at 571-87 (detailing the development of the
political right to bear arms in seventeenth century Britain).
68 Weatherup, supra note 36, at 973.
69 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 385 (M. Farrand ed.
1966).
70 Martin, Mr. Martin's Information to the General Assembly of the State of Mayland,
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 57, at 59-60.
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disarming the people."71 The fact that Pennsylvania muskets were
called in for repair during the period of debate led those opposing
ratification to suspect military suppression of their dissent. In an
address entitled To the People of Pennsylvania, Centinel asked, "What
otherwise is the meaning of disarming the militia, for the purpose
as it is said of repairing their musquets at such a particular period?
Does not the timing of the measure determine the intention?"
72
Aristocrotis, too, charged that a recall of the public arms "upon the
pretence of having them cleaned" was a way of "disarm[ing]" the
militia in order to discredit and disempower all objections to
ratification.
73
The verbal reflexes of "invasion" and "disarming" consistently
reveal that a nondistribution of military power is perceived not as
a secondary or tertiary attribute of a given contractual society, but
as something so profoundly incompatible with it that the form of
the government itself dissolves: contract disappears, and it is
replaced by latent despotism. Conversely, "militia" is understood to
mean "a distribution of military power," and this "distribution of
military power" is recognized as essential to the preservation of the
social contract itself. It is for this reason that nineteenth century
legal philosophers like William Rawle identified the militia "as the
palladium of the country"74 and political leaders like Governor
Brooks of Massachusetts called it "the palladium of ... civil
rights."75 Joseph Story, explaining why the right to bear arms is
"justly" considered "the palladium of the liberties of a republic,"
said that the militia provides a free country with a defense "against
sudden foreign invasions, domestic insurrections, and domestic
usurpations of power by rulers." 76 At the opening of this triad,
71 The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, 1787, reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at
665.
72 Centinel, To the People of Pennsylvania (Jan. 5, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 57, at 182.
73 Aristocrotis, The Government of Nature Delineated or An Exact Picture of the New
Federal Constitution (1788), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
57, at 210. This idiom of "disarming"-as well as the less serious "disabling" or
"depriving"-continued into the nineteenth century. For examples, see Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886); W. RAWLE, supra note 34, at 122-23.
74 W. RAWLE, supra note 34, at 121. On the use of the word "palladium" for
defense achieved through distribution, see 4 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 39,
at 338.
75 An Inquiry Into the Importance of the Militia, supra note 34, at 68.
76 2 J. STORY, supra note 5, at 620. For an overview of the association of arms
distribution with democracy in the wider philosophic framework, see Halbrook, The
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physical invasiveness is attributed to the foreign power, but by the
end it has migrated to the ground of internal inequity, as standing
armies "afford [a facile means] to ambitious and unprincipled rulers
to subvert the government or trample upon the rights of the
people."
7 7
Across several centuries of Anglo-American political and legal
thinking, the basic conception is consistent. In the language of
"invasion of rights" and "disarming," metaphor and material reality
ride close to one another. Sometimes, as when the American
colonists spoke of the British standing army,78 what was pictured
was the arrival onto the shore and entry into the country of an army
referred to as though it were foreign, even though the speakers
were themselves British subjects. The "foreignness," the invasive-
ness, and the capacity to disarm arise not from the fact that the
army comes from another shore but from the fact that the army is
independent of the population. The idiom of invasion and
disarming occurs equally if the speaker is referring to an internal
standing army, as when people on the island of Great Britain speak
of the standing army there, 79 or when people in the United States
prohibit a standing army attached to its own central government.
8 0
One is invaded if there is an inequality of arms in the population
group to which one belongs. If half the people in the space of a
room were armed, and the other half not, the second group would
by this language be disarmed, though the first intended the other
no harm.
8 1
Second Amendment as a Phenomenon of Classical Political Philosophy, in FIREARMS AND
VIOLENCE, ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 363-83 (D. Kates, Jr. ed. 1984) (tracing the
association in Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, Locke, Sidney, Rousseau, and others).
77 2 J. STORY, supra note 5, at 620.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
79 See supra text accompanying note 68.
80 See supra text accompanying notes 61-64, 69-73, 76.
81 The idiom of disarming continues into the present era. In an article entitled
Disarming Congress, Christopher Paine called attention to the way the Reagan
Administration lobbied Congress for MX missile funding while simultaneously
renewing Geneva talks. The purpose of that coupling, Paine argued, was "to rearm
the nation by disarming the public." Paine, Disarming Congress, BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS,June/July 1985, at 6, 6. Sanford Levinson also uses the word "disarm."
Of the United States, he wrote: "It is hard for me to see how one can argue that
circumstances have so changed as to make mass disarmament constitutionally
unproblematic." Levinson, supra note 37, at 656 (emphasis added). He later
connected the Tianamen Square tragedy to a situation entailing a "totally disarmed
population." Id. at 657.
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A free standing missile is the realization of everything that ever
was feared in a standing army. It permits the concentration of a
military force in a central location. It is attached to executive will
rather than to the will of the people. Its structures are permanently
in place and depend little on historical situations, leaving no room
for improvisations and debate. It is inanimate and depends on the
population for nothing. One recalls Madison's two hypothetical
governments, the first dependent on its population and therefore
permitted to stand, and the second independent and therefore
obliged to be eliminated.8 2 In the vocabulary of both the pre-
revolutionaries and the Federalists, free standing missiles have
disarmed and invaded us-not because we are moment by moment
subject to some rhetorical subjugation, but because we have lost our
power of authorization over the arms. The contractual society has
begun to slip into the blur of precontractual coercion.
Like Locke, the founders understood contract and coercion as
oppositional. Thus, the articles of ratification in Massachusetts and
in New Hampshire preface their assent with a prayer of thanks that
they can make a compact by assent rather than by fraud or surprise:
The Convention ... acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the
goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the universe in affording the
people of the United States, in the course of his providence, an
opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud or surprise,
of entering into an explicit and solemn compact with each other,
by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution... DO ... assent to
and ratify the said Constitution .... 
8 3
Like those ratifying the Constitution, those writing it also under-
stood the opposition between "contract" and "force" to be elemen-
tal. Madison stressed that "[e]ach State... [is] only to be bound by
its own voluntary act,"84 and The Federalist Papers as a whole both
open and close with Hamilton's climactic reiteration of the
82 See THE FEDERAuST No. 46, at 300 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
83 2 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 39, at 176 (emphasis added). Justice Story
noticed this language and commented on its peculiarity. See 1 J. STORY, supra note
5, at 248.
84 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 244 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). During the
Virginia ratification debate, Madison contrasted the peaceable formation of the
American government, which has "excited so much wonder and applause," with the
formation of other countries: "How was the imperfect union of the Swiss cantons
formed? By danger. How was the confederacy of the United Netherlands formed?
By the same.... How was the Germanic system formed? By danger .... " 3
RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 39, at 616-17.
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fundamental distinction. "[I]t seems to have been reserved to the
people of this country," he wrote in the first paragraph of the first
number, "to decide the important question, whether societies of
men are really capable or not of establishing good government from
reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to
depend for their political -constitutions on accident and force."
85
The final paragraph of the final number returns to the same
ground: "The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound
peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY,
to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxi-
ety."86 Subsequent legal commentaries continued to perceive the
Constitution within this basic framing opposition. So, for example,
in 1825, William Rawle opened A View of the Constitution by placing
it in the framework of contract, in contradistinction to political
structures that emerge "under compulsion, or by artifice, or
chance."8 7 The repeated placement of the opposition in a termi-
nal position-the beginning and the end of The Federalist Papers and
the opening of Rawle's commentary-underscores its primacy.
The opposition between contract and coercion does not logically
mean that the social contract must be empty of military provisions
or war-making powers. On the contrary, it is precisely war-making
that must be overseen with explicit constitutional provisions. It
must be given a level of rigorous scrutiny and must be subjected to
explicit consent procedures, warranted by nothing else within the
polis except the basic contract itself. This necessity accounts for the
rigor and persistence with which the phrase "without consent" is
attached to phrases about the standing army. With almost breath-
taking regularity, each of the sentences about "invasion" or
"disarming" cited earlier--in the Massachusetts Resolution, in
Franklin's letter, in Gerry's protest on the floor of the Assembly,
and in Agrippa's letters to the Gazette-posits the gateway of explicit
consent as a threshold that must be passed through. The terms
"army" and "consent" are inseparable. Other than the Instruments
of Ratification themselves, there is no issue to which the word
" consent" is so unrelentingly attached. Only in this way can "force"
be brought into and made compatible with the social contract. The
precise way in which the practice of contractual activity becomes
embedded in military structures in a civil society emerges below.
85 THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
86 Id. No. 85, at 527.
87 W. RAWLE, supra note 34, at 13.
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II. SEALING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THROUGH
DISTRIBUTIVE UNIFORMITY
Defeat is, as the previous section suggested, the perceived form
of nondistribution. But what is the material form of distribution?
The only way one can have coercive power within a contractual
society without eliminating the context of contractual structures is
by distribution. Thus, categories that appear to be ethically neutral,
like sheer material uniformity and sheer numerical spread, inevita-
bly lead to the ethically charged language of political equity,
representation, notions of citizenship, "civilian power," and self-
authorizing models such as voting. As nondistribution is envisioned
(even in a pacific context) as military defeat, so, conversely,
distribution is perceived as the material realization of contract.
A. Of Materiality and Sentience
In part, the desired uniformity is thought of as geographical
spread. During the Virginia ratification debates, Mr. Graysori,
worrying about centralization of the military, invoked as a warning
the model of Britain, where there were admirable laws about the
militia itself but where the militia had been permitted to atrophy in
Scotland and Ireland. 8 In part, the uniformity is conceived in
terms of a class spread. Thus, in the same Virginia ratification
debates, George Mason imagined the militia of a future day in
which "the higher classes of people," as he put it, are gradually
eliminated from the obligation of duty.89 In part, the uniformity
is also understood as a distribution across age and property. During
the ratification period, Richard Henry Lee's pamphlet, Letters of a
Federal Farmer, went within a few months through "four editions
(and several thousands) of the pamphlet."90 Asserting like Mason
a present equity, Lee proceeded to imagine hypothetical inequities
of the future when there would be a reversion from contract to the
model of coercion, with the young and landless lording over the old
and propertied:
18 See 3 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 39, at 418.
89 Id. at 426.
90 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 277 (P. Ford ed.
1888). On the contested authorship of these letters, see 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 57, at 214-17; Wood, The Authorship of the Letters from the
Federal Farmer, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 299 (1974).
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Should one fifth or one eighth part of the men capable of bearing
arms, be made a select militia, as has been proposed, and those
the young and ardent part of the community, possessed of but
little or no property, and all the others put upon a plan that will
render them of no importance, the former will answer all the
purposes of an army, while the latter will be defenceles.9 1
The young and landless, by means of an inequality of arms, would
suddenly rule over the older and landed. Universalizing provisions,
he acknowledged, must be made and lodged somewhere, "but still
we ought not so to lodge them, as evidently to give one order of
men in the community, undue advantages over others; or commit
the many to the mercy, prudence, and moderation of the few."
9 2
Mason's and Lee's statements together make it clear that when
there is an inequity of arms, one may be disadvantaged by being
included in the militia or may instead be disadvantaged by being
excluded. Both arguments agree only that the nonuniform model
is coercive. Almost any distinguishing feature-whether an irregular-
ity in guns, titles, military exercise, or service-sets off the contractu-
al alarm. 93  Aristocrotis, for example, saw the constitutional
division of the militia into two parts-active and nonactive-as
prelude to subjugation on the basis of class and age. 94 Concerning
one class made up of the young and landless (here the apprehen-
sions of Aristocrotis and Richard Henry Lee coincide), Aristocrotis
wrote:
91 Lee, Letters of a Federal Farner, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 90, at 305 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 306. Inequities in distribution across age continued to be a concern in
the nineteenth century. In An lnquihy Into the Importance of the Militia, Sumner
charted the gradual contraction in the age of those serving in the militia: at first
those exempted from service (aged 40 to 45) participated by contributing money, but
when a still younger rung of men (aged 35 to 40) was later excluded, those originally
exiled were relieved of even the obligation to contribute financially. See An Inquity
Into the Importance of the Militia, supra note 34, at 49-51.
93 Here, Gandhi's Autobiography is again illuminating. In a chapter called
"Miniature Satyagraha," he describes the acts of abstention and noncompliance taken
by himself and other Indians in a voluntary corps in the army. Their actions
protested not the existence of the military (they themselves had volunteered) but
inequities in authority between the English students appointed as their corporals and
themselves. They insisted that the position of corporal either be eliminated
altogether or that it come about by the vote of the corps rather than by the
appointment of the commanding officer. In effect, they established as the only
permissible alternatives either complete equality, or a non-equality brought about by
the explicit vote of the participants, as Gandhi himself was the "chairman" and
"unofficial" representative of the corps. See 2 M. GANDHI, Supra note 35, at 525-29.
94 See Aristocrotis, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 57, at 202.
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[By their] daring of spirit [they] may gain an ascendancy over the
minds of the vulgar .... The second class or inactive militia,
comprehends all the rest of the peasants; viz. the farmers,
mechanics, labourers, etc. which good policy will prompt the
government to disarm. It would be dangerous to trust such a
rabble as this with arms in their hands.
95
Two unexpected features emerge across these various claims for
uniformity. The constancy of their appearance underscores their
importance. The first is materiality. The reversion to the coercive
model is pictured as a divestiture of the people's materiality, their
very physical substance. Richard Henry Lee wrote:
It is true, the yeomanry of the country [at the present time]
possess the lands, the weight of property, possess arms, and are
too strong a body of men to be openly offended-and, therefore,
it is urged, they will take care of themselves, that men who shall
govern will not dare pay any disrespect to their opinions.95
But he went on to imagine that a central power, Congress as it
happens, could "by modelling the militia" gradually over "twenty or
thirty years... by means imperceptible" divest men "of that boasted
weight and strength."97 The same apprehension of material
divestiture is pictured where arms themselves are evenly dispersed
but the insignia of military authority are not. In his 1783 tract
against the Order of Cincinnati, Cassius predicted a race of
hereditary patricians with access to centers of civil and military
power "[a]nd the whole country besides themselves, a mere mob of
plebeians without weight or estimation."9 8  The nonuniform
dispersal of guns present in the displacement of a militia by a
standing army disarms and severs parts of the body. Sometimes a
specified part of the body is removed, as when John DeWitt, in his
essays in the American Heral4d described the new government's
discomfort with putting "arms in the hands of a nervous people" as
the necessity of "catching Samson asleep to trim him of his
locks." 99 More frequent are the steady stream of references to a
generalized form of bodily materiality: "weight," "burden," "firm-
ness," or "ruggedness."
100
95 Id. at 202-03.
96 Lee, supra note 91, at 305.
9 7 
Id.
98 Cassius, Order of Cincinnati, supra note 61, at 13.
99 DeWitt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Am. Herald,
Oct.-Dec. 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 57, at 36.
100 Sumner, for example, called people at the time of the revolution "that rugged
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people" and spoke of the "masculine virtues of constancy, fidelity, andfirmness, which
governed her conduct." See An Inquihy Into the Importance of the Militia, supra note 34,
at 60 (emphasis added). Though Sumner here calls the virtues "masculine," and
though the vocabulary can easily be read as gendered, it would in the long run be an
error to read the idiom narrowly since the language of materialization belongs to
"resistance" whether militarist or pacifist and whether male or female. This same
constellation of words, for example, recurs in Gandhi's conception of resistance:
judging the English phrase 'passive resistance" inadequate to express the actions in
which he was engaged, Gandhi designed a public contest to elicit an alternative
phrase. Out of the contest emerged the then newly invented, but now familiar word,
Satyagraha, chosen because it means firmness in the truth ("Sat--truth, Agraha=firm-
ness"). See 2 M. GANDHI, supra note 35, at 474.
A similar emphasis on "firmness" and "materiality" occurs in conjunction with
women soldiers, military leaders, or heads of state. Antonia Fraser devotes a chapter
of The Warrior Queens to "Iron Ladies." See A. FRASER, THE WARRIOR QUEENS 312,
315 (1989). Though the designation of Golda Meir's "iron hand" originates with a
later president of Israel, and the designation of Margaret Thatcher as the "Iron Lady"
originates with the Soviet Union's Red Star, the attributions were accepted by the
women themselves. Id.
In her poem on BoadiceaJudy Grahn salutes the same resistant materiality: "I
am the wall at the lip of the water/I am the rock that refused to be battered." Id. at
304. When woman soldiers themselves speak, the stress on a resistant materiality
becomes evident less in the materials of metal, iron, or stone than in the fact of the
resistant body. In a missive to the English military leadership, Joan of Arc wrote:
King of England, and you Duke of Bedford, calling yourself Regent of
France... do right .... Surrender to the Maid sent hither.., the keys of
all the good towns you have taken and laid waste in France .... And you,
archers, comrades in arms, gentles and others, who are before the town of
Orleans, retire in God's name to your own country. If you do not, expect
to hear tidings from the Maid who will shortly come upon you to your very
great hurt.... I am sent here in God's name, the King of Heaven, to drive
you body for body out of all France.
M. WARNER, JOAN OF ARC: THE IMAGE OF FEMALE HEROISM 68 (1981).
A Palestinian woman, expressing her readiness to fight whenever called,
described her political resistance in terms of the body:
Often there are applications and documents to fill out and always there is
the question of where one is born .... [W]hen the application is returned,
Palestine is always crossed out and Israel written in, instead.... [N]ow, I
write what they wish and I say nothing. But I am Palestinian. My hair is
Palestinian, my body is Palestinian, and the words I speak are Palestinian.
My death will be Palestinianl
VALIANT WOMEN IN WAR AND EXILE: THIRTY-EIGHT TRUE STORIES 58 (S. Hayton-
Keeva ed. 1987). The emphasis on bodily materiality found among female soldiers,
whether in the medieval or modern period, must be distinguished from the external
concentration on one narrow attribute of the body: the sexual. Antonia Fraser has
observed the tendency of women soldiers to be described obsessively by men as
alternately chaste and insatiable. See A. FRASER, supra, at 11. Female pacifism reveals
the same stress on bodily materiality. It is evident, for example, in the protest
strategies of Greenham women who conceive of their bodies as a "constant source of
freshly invented obstructions." Snitow, Holding the Line at Greenham, MOTHERJONES,
Feb./Mar. 1985, at 30, 42.
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Material density is key to the political construct of uniformity.
In all these instances, the material nonuniformity of persons
(geographical location, class, age, land) must be compensated for
and irregularities eliminated by the strict material uniformity of
guns, insignia, and degree of participatory service. In fact, in the
federal convention, in the ratification conventions, and in most
subsequent discussions of the right to bear arms, it is startling how
often the discussion takes place across the specified material
attributes of the weapons themselves. The members of the
constitutional convention, for example, debated whether there could
be geographical variations of arms-rifles in one local, muskets in
another 0l-and disagreed about the degree of specificity required
by words like "arming" and "organizing": "[Then Mr. King, b]y way
of explanation said that by 'organizing,' the committee [he] meant
proportioning the officers and men-by 'arming,' specifying the
kind, size and caliber of arms-and by 'disciplining,' prescribing the
manual exercise, evolutions, etc."
10 2
The same startling attention to materiality surfaces in William
H. Sumner's brilliant 1823 analysis of the militia, An Inquiry Into the
Importance of the Militia to a Free Commonwealth.1 03  For Sumner
the civil nature of the military depended on its being distributive in
the most concrete sense. Irregularities in material form became for
him alarming evidence of the country's growing indifference to the
importance of keeping an army within a contractual frame:
This is to be apprehended from the distribution of mutilated
compilations, and what are called amended editions of the United
States System of Infantry Tactics ... for the militia, in several of
the states, the tendency of which, will be to defeat the great design
of [C]ongress for establishing [a] uniform system of discipline, and
field exercise for the army and militia, throughout the United
States.
1 04
The 1939 Supreme Court case United States v. Miller10 5 might
be criticized for the extraordinary emphasis the Court put on the
physical attributes of the weapon. The ruling appeared to be stuck
to the physical surfaces of the particular gun in the case:
101 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 69, at
386.
'02 MADISON REARRANGED, supra note 47, at 520-21.
103 See An Inquiry Into the Importance of the Militia, supra note 34, at 65.
104 Id. at 65-66.
105 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in
length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear
such an instrument.
10 6
But that odd specificity of materialization, however inappropriate to
the Court's ruling, belongs to a long tradition of attention to the
physical properties of military equipment, as the Court's own
citations from earlier provisions showed:
[a citizen must] provide himself, at his own Expense, with a good
Musket or Firelock, a sufficient Bayonet and Belt, a Pouch with a
Box therein to contain not less than Twenty-four Cartridges suited
to the Bore of his Musket or Firelock, each Cartridge containing
a proper Quantity of Powder and Ball, two spare Flints, a Blanket
and Knapsack.
10 7
Although the principle of materiality sometimes surfaces in
mystifying attention to the tattered covers of an infantry manual or
the length of a barrel of a gun, in fact what is being registered is the
transformation of military structures into civil structures, the basic
miracle of the social contract. The principle of materiality is itself
audible in the doctrinal formulation, "the right to bear arms." To
bear arms is to authorize the bearing of arms, to bear them in the
sense of carrying them; to bear them in the sense of standing up
under them; to bear them also in the sense of risking the hazard to
which having them obligates us. The word "bear"-with its compli-
cated undertow of physical weight and the physical actions of
sustaining, pressing, or (as in giving birth) bringing forth that
weight-has throughout its history licensed the conflation of things
within the body (to bear a baby, Shakespeare's to bear eyes, Scott's
to bear a brain, Byron's to bear a heart) with things on or close to
the body (the bearing of clothes and of weapons).1 08 The work
of material uniformity is to make irrelevant material characteristics
of personhood: age, geography, class, and property. 1° 9 Because
'o Id. at 178. On thejudicial attention to the physical properties of weapons, see
Haibrook, What the Framers Intended: A Lingustic Analysis of the Right to "Bear Arms,"
49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 158-59 (1986); Kates, supra note 36, at 248, 249,
259-60; Weatherup, supra note 36, at 168.
107 307 U.S. at 181.
"' These references for "bear" are drawn from the four-page entry for.the word
in The Oxford English Dictionay. See THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 731-34 (1933).
109 Similarly, race is later made irrelevant, and still later, gender. See infra text
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evenness permits everything else to be uneven, "collective" or
"uniform" rights simultaneously allow high degrees of individuality
and hence come to be misidentified as themselves "individual." The
insistence that solid infantry books be dispersed evenly across the
entire geography (or age or class range) relieves the population
from being required to occupy a given local geography (or age or
class) in order to become eligible for full political empowerment.
The stress on materiality is deepened and clarified by the second
attribute which emerges beneath the surface of the call for unifor-
mity: sentience, the capacity for representative feeling, or, as it was
repeatedly called during the ratification debates, fellow-feeling. The
overt descriptions of the militia, as well as the underlying theoretical
accounts of "representation" and "con-sent" (whose etymology in
"con-sentir," "to feel with," makes overt the continuity of feeling
across persons),110 turn on these terms. Not everyone must serve,
but delegates from all geographical areas, class, age, and property
levels must be present to have "fellow-feeling" and judge the
aversiveness or the worth of the actions undertaken. The issue is
ethical; it is conceived as a matter of fairness, an attempt to
establish what in twentieth century discussion of distributive justice
is called a "symmetry of everyone's relations to each other."
111
Thus at the Virginia Assembly, Mr. Mason had formulated the
uniformity argument on the militia using these terms. A standing
army, a militia chosen from the central government, or a militia
drawn unevenly across geography, age, and class, will be nonsen-
tient, without a knowledge of the population's feelings and interests:
"The representation being so small and inadequate, they will have
no fellow-feeling for the people."1 12 The phrase "fellow-feeling"
recurred, almost as an incremental refrain, in Patrick Henry's
brilliant analysis of contract before the same Virginia Assembly.115
accompanying notes 151-59.
110 While many etymologies are controversial, the derivation of "consent" in "con"
and "sentire" is consistent with numerous authorities. See I E. KLEIN, A COMPREHEN-
SIVE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: DEALING WITH THE
ORIGINS OF WORDS AND THEIR SENSE DEVELOPMENT THUS ILLUSTRATING THE HISTORY
OF CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE 337 (1966); C. ONIONS, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 206 (1966); E. PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH 116, 605 (1966). The sense of the word as "a
feeling with or across persons" is apprehensible in the closely related word
"consentient."
"I J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).
112 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 39, at 426.
113 See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 766, 770, 809, 817. Common to Patrick
1991] 1293
1294 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 139:1257
The center of the collective case against the standing army is
precisely its being nonsentient, severed from the knowledge of the
sentience of the population. "A standing army is still a standing
army by whatever name it is called; they are a body of men distinct
from the body of the people."114 The idea of the standing army
as cut off from the feelings of the citizenry-separated from any base
in sentience-recurs constantly.115 It eventually gives rise to the
most frequently invoked trope associated with the standing army:
the image of the nonsentient "engine," a word that passes up and
down the Atlantic coast during the ratification period in the letters
of Luther Martin, the letters of Centinel, the Essays by a Farmer, and
the writings of Brutus.116 The mute nonsentient missiles of the
twentieth century, almost wholly independent of the human
population they are empowered to destroy, are a vast magnification
of this most dreaded attribute of the standing army.
Though the idea of "sentience," "con-sentir," or "fellow-feeling"
opens out into the notion of political representation, it preserves at
its most minimal the guarantee of "self-representation"-the certainty
that participants will at least have "fellow feelings" for their own
embodied personhood. For both the eighteenth and nineteenth
century, that capacity for "self-interest" was the greatest safeguard
on military power, the final defense of the contract, the "palladium"
of all republican liberties. Sumner's Inquiry Into the Importance of the
Militia to a Free Commonwealth unfolded the principle of self-interest
as the center from which the capacity for con-sentir and the
Henry's position during the Revolution and during the ratification were both his
framing of all political issues in contractual language and his insistence on the
distribution of military authority. His most widely known revolutionary speech
("Gentlemen may cry, peace, peace-but there is no peace. The war is actually begun!
... Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we here idle?... Is life so
dear or peace so sweet... Give me liberty or give me deathl") was spoken to support
a sequence of three resolutions lie had made, first asserting the importance of a
militia to a free government, then calling out and arming that militia. See R. MEADE,
PATRICK HENRY: PRACTICAL REVOLUTIONARY 28-29, 35 (1969).
114 Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 57, at 407
(quoting a speaker before the British House of Commons).
115 See, e.g., Essays by a Farmer, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
57, at 22 (describing how troops in countries that have lost political and civil liberties
"must not feel like" the population and must have "separate interests" from them).
i16 See Mr. Martin's Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland and
Letters of Centinel To the Freemen of Pennsylvania, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIsT,
supra note 57, at 27, 140; Essays by a Farmer, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 57, at 33; Brutus, To the People of the State of New York, in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 57, at 418.
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possibility of civil structures emerge: "The history of all ages proves
that large armies are dangerous to civil liberty. Militia, however
large, never can be; for it is composed of citizens only, armed for
the preservation of their own privileges." 17  Uniformity, then,
aspires to preserve the contract through a kind of "sentient
materialization," a term whose significance for the contemporary
problem of nuclear arms will be unfolded below.
The aspiration towards a uniformity that achieves this sentient
materialization entails a rigorous stress on numbers. Simultaneous-
ly, it holds within it an idea about political self-authorization. I want
to end by elaborating each of the two ideas because together they
reinstate the consensual act in the material plane.
B. Numbers Count
The first argument concerns numbers, their materiality, and the
way in which that materiality performs a braking function on the
rush to go to war. The Framers worked to make the initiation of
war difficult and its cessation easy. During the convention, Oliver
Ellsworth's judgment that it "should be more easy to get out of war,
than into it"l ls was shared by most other delegates. George
Mason said, "He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for
facilitating peace."1 19 The notion of clogging or clotting played a
critical role throughout the convention, the ratification de-
bates,1 20 and later legal commentary. Joseph Story saluted the
principle of "clogging" when he wrote: "It should therefore be
difficult in a republic to declare war; but not to make peace."
121
William Rawle similarly saluted this principle when he observed:
"[C]ongress alone can subject us to the dubious results of formal
war, a smaller portion of the government can restore us to
peace."
122
117 An Inquiry Into the Importance of the Militia, supra note 34, at 7-8.
n8 MADISON REARRANGED, supra note 47, at 514.
119 Id. at 514. In Madison's notes, the record of Mason's argument leads directly
to the record of the shift from the word "make" war to "declare" war in article I,
section 8. The passage was also cited by Richard B. Morris in his statement before
the Foreign Relations Committee during the hearings on war powers. See 93 CONG.
REc. 1408 (1973).
120 For example, Brutus, one of the most important of the anti-federalists,
sometimes was absorbed with counting the numbers involved in military decisions.
See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 57, at 413.121 j. STORY, supra note 5, at 87.
122 W. RAWLE, supra note 34, at 106.
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Those forming the Constitution, whether at the federal
assembly, in the ratification conventions, or in the newspaper
debates, always aspired to small armies when they spoke in terms of
the nation's injuring power. 12 3  But they always pictured large
numbers when speaking in terms of the base of authorization.
124
They aspired towards a situation that is the opposite of the one we
have today, in which the injuring capacity has been pushed to
123 At no point in these writings does the call for universal military service express
an aspiration for a massive offensive military power. In the federal convention,
suggestions are made that only 1/'4 or 1/10 of the militia be in training at any one
time and that the entire militia be kept fit by a gradual "rotation" across the fractions.
See MADISON REARRANGED, supra note 47, at 518.
124 This insistence on a wide base of authorization is visible in writings about
inclusiveness across differences in age, class, and geography. See supra text
accompanying notes 88-89, 92, 112, 120. It is also visible in the recurring preoccupa-
tion with the discrepancy between the size of an army and the size of a militia, a
disproportion ensuring the population's capacity for self-defense and resistance. For
example, Madison wrote:
The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing
army can be carried in any country does not exceed one hundredth part of
the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to
bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army
of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be
opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in
their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for
their common liberties and united and conducted by governments
possessing their affections and confidence.
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This numerical
juxtaposition continually reoccurs. In an 1860 address to Congress on the militia,
C.L. Vallandigham contrasted the size of the army and the official returns measuring
the size of the militia for the year 1808 when the population was seven million (3,204
and 636,386, respectively). See 36 CONG. DEB. 1130 (1860) (address of Hon C. L.
Vallandigham of Ohio to the House of Representatives) [hereinafter Vallandigham].
He then contrasted the size of the army and the militia for the year 1858 when the
population was about thirty million (17,498 and 2,755,726, respectively). Id. at 1130.
The double aspiration-a small numerical base for risk and a large numerical base
for authorization-is summarized perhaps most succinctly in an 1836 address to the
Congress about the militia: "Let the means of defence be as ample, and the burdens
on the people be as light as possible." CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., lst Sess. 235, 237
(1836) (address of Ransom Gillet to the House of Representatives) [hereinafter
Gillet]. Madison described that same vision of small risk and large authorization in
The Federalist Papers:
The Union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext for
a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with
a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding
posture to foreign ambition than America disunited, with a hundred
thousand veterans ready for combat.
THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 258 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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extremely large levels, but the base of authorization has been
reduced to the smallest possible number of people.
President Nixon stated during the Watergate crisis, "I can go
into my office and pick up the telephone and in 25 minutes 70
million people will be dead." 125 This announcement should
probably not count heavily against Nixon or any other individual
President. Justice Davis once wrote that this nation "has no right to
expect that it will always have wise and humane rulers, sincerely
attached to the principles of the Constitution." 126 For this very
reason, solutions must be structural and independent of psychologi-
cal accidents.
President Nixon's statement had the important effect of calling
attention within the government to the presidential first-use
arrangement. It led to a genre of discussion that centers on the
question of how many people a presidential order to launch, or
alternatively a submarine captain's order to launch, must pass
through before it reaches Polaris or Minuteman sites. George H.
Questor conceptualized the issue in a way that ties it back to the
"clogging" or "clotting" formulations of the federalists. Questor
asked: "[How many intervening layers of possibly resistant humanity
does he have to pass through?"127 Questor, as though reassured, at
one point remarked:
The published accounts suggest that the positive decisions of as
many as three or four [submarine naval] officers altogether are
required, to decide whether a duly authorized signal to launch
their missiles had indeed been received, and that the physical act
of firing them involves the turning of keys at locations physically
remote from each other.
128
The order must pass through the authorization of four or five
before the weapons pass through the bodies of many millions.
Repeatedly, in discussions of nuclear arms, fears about authorization
by only one are calmed by reassurances that it is actually two, as
fears about two are calmed by reassurances that it is actually twenty,
125 See Questor, Presidential Authority and Nuclear Weapons, in Hearings: First Use
of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 8, at 218.
126 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866), quoted inJ. STORY, supra note
5, at 103. Davis's words recall Madison's warning in The Federalist Papers that
"[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm." THE FEDERALiST No. 10, at
80 ( Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
i7 See Hearings: First Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 8, at 218 (emphasis
added).
128 Id. at 215.
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and fears about twenty by reassurances that it is actually twenty-five.
But in terms of the structure of the Constitution, talk of two or
twenty or twenty-five is simply a species of category error.
It is worth remembering how many "intervening layers of
possibly resistant humanity" the Constitution envisioned us as
having to pass through before war could be fought. In arriving at
these numbers, a general principle was continually enacted: it was
always-as noticed earlier-the largest possible base over which the
founders had control. Thus, when the constitutional convention
determined in article I, section 8 that the full Congress should have
the power to declare war, they made the first consensual site not the
President (an alternative at once rejected) and not the Senate alone
(a possibility introduced for its speed and, importantly, rejected on
the basis of its speed). So, too, when the Constitution then went to
the states, the second consensual locus was made the entire
population.
These decisions were made despite the pressures toward
"emergency" and "speed" that have always been urged in association
with war.1 29 Justice Story wrote a lengthy passage about the logic
of including both houses in article I, section 8:
Large bodies necessarily move slowly; and where the co-operation
of different bodies is required, the retardation of any measure
must be proportionally increased. In the ordinary course of
legislation this may be no inconvenience. But in the exercise of
such a prerogative as declaring war, despatch, secrecy, and vigor
are often indispensable, and always useful towards success. On the
other hand, it may be urged in reply, that the power of declaring
12 9 The strategic report Discriminate Detefrence, written by The Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy, provides an example of this pressure; the opening
pages make the remarkable suggestion that the country needs more "national
consensus" about strategic matters so that it can have "fewer legislative restrictions
that inhibit its effectiveness." COMMISSION ON INTEGRATED LONG-TERM STRATEGY,
DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE 2 (1988). The complaint about legislative impediments
continually re-emerges. Restrictions on military persons and restrictions on the
training of foreign police forces are called "a self-inflicted strategic wound." Id. at 19.
The refusal to train armies in countries that do not abide by standards of nuclear
control is referred to as a species of "micro-management," and a Congress is
imagined that will exercise its powers of partnership with the executive by restraining
and effacing itself. Id. at 47. The legislative prohibitions on testing of our ASAT are
presented as an impediment, as are Congress's low military appropriations during
periods free of crisis and its reluctance to sanction even "modest expenditures in
many Third World countries." Id. at 54, 58, 61. Such impatience with legislative
encumbrances is remarkable because the aspiration for an unchecked military-
executive implies a tolerance of monarchic or totalitarian forms of government. Far
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war is not only the highest sovereign prerogative, but that it is, in
its own nature and effects, so critical and calamitous, that it
requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all
the councils of the nation. War, in its best estate, never fails to impose
upon the people the most burdensome taxes, and personal sufferings. It is
always injurious, and sometimes subversive of the great commercial,
manufacturing, and agricultural interests. Nay, it always involves the
prosperity, and not unfrequently the existence, of a nation. It is sometimes
fatal to public liberty itself, by introducing a spirit of military glory ....
It should therefore be difficult in a republic to declare war; but not to make
peace. The representatives of the people are to lay the taxes to
support a war, and therefore have a right to be consulted as to its
propriety and necessity. The executive is to carry it on, and
therefore should be consulted as to its time, and the ways and
means of making it effective. The co-operation of all the branches
of the legislative power ought, upon principle, to be required in
this the highest act of legislation, as it is in all others. Indeed,
there might be a propriety even in enforcing still greater restric-
tions, as by requiring a concurrence of two-thirds of both
houses.
13 0
One of the great peculiarities of the numbers question is the
belief that the President is more than one person. The fact that
presidential election 1 1 involves the whole population is wrongly
taken as putting greater numerical weight behind the President's
from being embarrassed by this implication, the report unembarrassedly and
repeatedly expresses its envy for dictatorships free of legislative restrictions: the
"United States has some large competitive disadvantages" in its capacity to move
troops "[b]ecause [the Soviet client states] are dictatorships [and] can secretly order
aid missions and military units abroad and disguise their missions there." Id. at 21.
It complains about the crisis-driven "stop-go" military spending of the U.S. and
presents as an object of aspiration the "formidable stability that has long marked
Soviet defense investment." Id. at 59. Elsewhere it observes that a "[a] dictator, or
an involuntary coalition dominated by a dictatorship, has less trouble in preparing to
launch military operations." Id. at 64.
The report is admirable in its emphasis on conventional weapons and in its
aversion to nuclear weapons, the use of which can so quickly destroy "a civil society."
Id. at 66. But in its contempt for legislative restrictions, in its vision of an
unencumbered military-executive partnership, and in its envy of the military
advantages of totalitarian states, it seems to have quite lost sight of what a civil society
is.
130 2 J. STORY, supra note 5, at 87 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
"' "Election" may actually be less essential to the Executive argument than it
appears, since versions of the argument occur even where the Executive has not been
elected. Hanna Pitkin observed that prior to the English Civil War, "the king sought
to keep the members of Parliament in their place by arguing that each spoke only for
his own separate community; they did not [unlike him] collectively 'represent' the
realm." H. PITIUN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 252 (1967).
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solitary action than behind congressional action, even though
Congress entails a much larger body of persons and is collectively
elected by the entire national population. The numerical juxtaposi-
tion of the presidential electorate with the electorate of an isolated
congressional district is a mental act that would be relevant only if
one were choosing whether a President or a solitary member of
Congress had more authority to kill seventy million persons. That
numerical comparison is instead inappropriately used to invalidate
the entire congressional authorization of this most fundamental of
contractual events.
Locke, urging that military powers be held within the social
contract, warned that anyone is "in a much worse condition, who is
exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command
of 100,000, than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of
100,000 single men."13 2 A population that believes it is more safe
to be subject to a solitary executive empowered to kill millions than
to confront conventional troops has rejected the ground of its own
authority within the social contract.
What would be the numbers-how many intervening layers of
possibly resistant humanity-would make nuclear technology consonant
with the Constitution? It would begin, but only begin, with the 535
of Congress. The term "people" in early constitutional writings is
used, according to legal opinion in one court case, "to express the
entire numerical aggregate of the community, whether state or
national, in contradistinction to the government or legislature."
1 33
Today that would be approximately 250 million. If one takes
instead the 14% who participated in World War I, the number
would be thirty-five million. If one takes the 3% estimated to have
fought in 17th- and 18th-century wars, today it would be over seven
million.13 4 If one takes a two-thirds figure at one point intro-
duced as the number needed from the states to authorize the raising
of an army (a proposal Madison thought went too far) the number
today would be over 166 million. Numbers are dangerous, but the
widely straddling figures from 3% to 66%-from seven million to 166
million persons-are invoked here simply to indicate that they are
not in the neighborhood of the one or two or twenty persons that
enter into nuclear discussions and that have been for the last few
1 32 j. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 72.
133 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (1 How.) 2, 21 (1849).
134 The 3% and 14% ratios of participants to total population in earlier wars are
given in Q. WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 234, 658, 660 (1942).
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decades presented to this population in a deeply insulting and
gravely unconstitutional mimesis of collective decision-making.
Because democratic weapons have always allowed some rough
equivalence between the ratio of those injured and those authoriz-
ing the injury,13 5 perhaps the number required for launch autho-
rization ought to be set by those figures-Nixon's seventy million,
for example.
C. Political Self-Authorization: Civil Rights and Rights of Arms
Another great peculiarity in the language of nuclear argument
is the concern that only the President should control the firing of
nuclear weapons and not a military officer, because the Constitution
tried to guarantee "civilian control." In fact, discussions of the
militia and of the right to bear arms did stress the category of
civilian, but "civilian" expressed distance from, not proximity to,
executive control. Adam Smith wrote: "In a militia, the character
of the labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of
the soldier: in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates
over every other character; and in this distinction seems to consist
the essential difference between those two different species of
military force." 13 6 Nothing in the early writings lends support to
the notion that the insistence on civilian, rather than military,
control could ever have been addressed by imagining a single civilian
in control. As New Jersey Senator Case argued in the 1976
congressional hearings on the United States's nuclear policy of
presidential first-use:
It was pointed out by Abraham Lincoln in a letter to his great
friend, William Herndon, that it was this power of the kings to
involve their countries in war that our Constitution understood to
be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions. The Founding
Fathers resolved to frame the Constitution so that no man could
keep that power for himself.
13 7
Executive control of the army was, from the infancy of the
republic onward, consistently seen as the subversion rather than the
fulfillment of the contractual requirement for civilian authority.
135 For an account of this equivalence, its role in legitimating war, and its
disappearance in the shift from conventional to nuclear war, see E. SCARRY, supra
note 27, at 151-57.
136 A. SMrrH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 660 (E. Cannan ed. 1937) (5th ed. 1789).
137 119 CONG. REc. 1395 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Case, N.J.).
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Among the "[f]acts...submitted to a candid world" in the Declaration
of Independence were two yoked clauses: "He has kept among us,
in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our
legislature. He has affected to render the Military independent of
and superior to the Civil Power."138 The yoking of these two-the
prohibition of an executive armed force and the assertion of the
supremacy of civil over military institutions-recurs in many of the
state bills of rights: Virginia (1776), Pennsylvania (1776), Maryland
(1776), Vermont (1777), Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire
(1783).39 The phrasing of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights-"and the military power shall always be held in exact
subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it" 140 -
clarifies the way the issue was pictured. Whenever early tracts on
the military introduce an "aesthetic" idiom, whenever they begin to
speak of the "beauty" of the militia,14 1 what has instigated the
138 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
139 The state-by-state Declarations of Rights are reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 34, at 235, 266, 280, 319, 331), 375.
140 Id. at 342-43.
141 For example, in his 1786 report to Congress on his plan for the militia,
Secretary of War General Knox periodically used an aesthetic vocabulary of light-
"lustre," "splendor," "glorious'--in close proximity to statements stressing the
principles of universality and equality on which the militia must be based. Shortly
after emphasizing that the militia must be organized by the states "under one and the
same system, to be established by Congress, including the formation of battalions and
uniform equipments," Knox spoke of the importance of instilling"habits which shall
give a lustre to the American character. The people universally should be furnished
with arms, and know how to use them." J. WILLARD, PLAN FOR THE GENERAL
ARRANGEMENT OF THE MILITIA OF THE UNITED STATES (READ BEFORE THE MASSACHU-
spTs HISTORIcAL SOcIETY) 8 (1863) (emphasis added). For the vocabulary of
"splendor" and "glorious," see id. at 33, 38.
This association between "fairness" in the sense of equal distribution and
"fairness" in the sense of beauty continued into the nineteenth century. For example,
in his 1826 paper on the militia presented to Secretary of War Barbour, William H.
Sumner devoted half of the paper to the issue of uniformity. See W. SUMNER, A
PAPER ON THE MILXTIA PRESENTED TO THE HON.JAMES BARBOUR, SECRETARY OF WAR
IN NOVEMBER, 1826, at 15-30 (1833). The proximity of the words "uniform" or
"equal" to the word "beauty" can be sensed in the frequency with which "nonuniform-
ity" is explicitly coupled to the words "deformity" or "defect," sometimes even
occurring in apposition, as in the phrase "defective, unequal, and oppressive." Id. at
18. Observing the variations acros: states in the numerical composition of organiza-
tional units such as companies and regiments, Sumner wrote: "All this deformity arises
from the operation of the existing laws, defeating the design of those who granted the
power to the National Government, for the sake of ensuring a perfect uniformity of
organization." Id. at 15 (emphasis added). He then moved immediately from this
abstract aesthetic vocabulary of "deformity," "design," and "perfect," to a more
concrete and tangible aesthetic practice: "[Congress] can provide arms and
equipments for both officers and soldiers, and authorize the delivety of colors and
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language of beauty is not the luxuriance of the uniforms or the
parading display of military might, but the reverse. What is
beautiful is the miracle of watching the principle of force brought
into and held within the contractual frame. It is this that the parade
of the militia displays. The bright uniforms signal uniformity: the
decentering, diffusion, distribution, and hence fundamental
alteration of the principle of force now relocated from its original
position outside to its new position inside the "national pact."
142
In his extraordinary treatise on the subject, William Sumner invokes
John Adams as the "civil" father and describes the militia as a "civil"
institution that is the palladium of "civil" rights because of its
distributive character.14 The loss of the distributive is the loss of
civil beauty, as is audible in Cassius's lament: "They have laid in
musical instruments from the national armories." Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in a speech to the U.S. Congress about arrangements for the militia in the
state of New York, Ransom Gillet countless times stressed the "civil" nature of the
militia by speaking of "citizen soldiers" and by stressing uniformity across age and
wealth. He spoke of the thrill--"the beating of the high military pulse"-that comes
on seeing the militia not in battle but in the "brilliant military array, conducted in an
orderly manner" during "training and martial exhibition." Gillet, supra note 124, at
235, 237. For similar kinds of emphases, see Vallandigham, supra note 124, at 1130
(reciting in elaborate detail the precise equipment provided for the militia in a 1792
congressional act; for example, "every private among dragoons would be required to
find a serviceable horse, of the same height [14 hands high], with bridal, saddle,
mailpillion, valise, holsters, breast-plates, crupper, boots, spurs, pistols, saber, and
cartouch-box").
Interestingly, both Knox in 1786 and Sumner in 1826 perceived the continuous
uniformity of the civil militia as a cloth or fabric spanning (and presumably
sheltering, like a bright canopy) the whole country. Knox said:
[F]or a sum less than four hundred thousand dollars annually, which,
apportioned on three millions of people, would be little more than one-
eighth of a dollar each, an energetic republican militia may be durably
established, the invaluable principles of liberty secured and perpetuated, and
a dignified national fabric erected on the solid foundation of public virtue.
J. WILLARD, supra, at 29 (emphasis altered). Sumner, while stressing the importance
of nationally determined uniformity, simultaneously credited the states' decentering
of power through the militia"as the grand physical characteristic of state sovereignty.
Without it, the pillars of the Union would be too slender to support the nationalfabric." W.
SUMNER, supra at 9 (emphasis added).142 Brutus, To The Citizens of the State of New York, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 57, at 375.
143 See An Inquiry Into the Importance of the Militia, supra note 34, at 61, 68 (citing
Governor Brooks's observation of the need for an equalization of the militia'.s
"burdens upon the different classes of the community," an observation equating the
"civil" and "distributive" principles).
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ruins that fine, plain, level state of civil equality, over which the
sight of the beholder passed with pleasure."
144
The idiom of "fairness" is, of course, drawn more often from the
sphere ofjustice than from the sphere of aesthetics. The profound
inappropriateness of ever applying the phrase "civilian control" to
a President's solitary control of nuclear weapons is evident in the
insistently decentered meaning of "civilian," an emphasis visible in
the conflation of the right to bear arms with the right to vote, a
final, and critically important, distributive attribute of the amend-
ment.
The very small number of Supreme Court cases on the second
amendment have affirmed its connection to citizenship in the
fourteenth amendment,145 to voting,146 and to the right of as-
sembly.147 More serious evidence of the interweaving of voting
and arms occurs in the history of the extension of the franchise
itself. Both the House and Senate judiciary hearings on the twenty-
sixth amendment repeatedly cite the participation of those fighting
in Vietnam and of those exercising power to consent by refusing to
be drafted as having earned for that generation and all that followed
the right to vote at a younger age. 148 In fact, in the Senate Judi-
144 See Order of Cincinnat4 supra note 61, at 10.
145 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1886); United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875).
146 See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at B55-56.
147 See Presser, 116 U.S. at 264-67; Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551-52. The link between
military and civil rights is descriptive of other countries as well. On the connection
between the armies of the British citizenry and the emergence of a concept of civil
rights in England, see Hardy, supra note 37, at 571.
14' The generational argument-used on behalf ofa constitutional change that is
transgenerational-occurs throughout the Senate testimony and is prominently
displayed in the executive summary report. That report observed that the Cox
Commission on student protests at Columbia University had "called the present
generation 'the most intelligent,' 'the most idealistic,' the 'most sensitive to public
issues,' and with a 'higher level of social conscience than preceding generations.'"
SENATE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, REPORT ON LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18, S.
REP. No. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT ON LOWERING
THE VOTING AGE]. President Nixon is cited as testifying that the country's youth are
"better equipped today than ever in the past .... [They exemplify] the highest
qualities of mature citizenship." .1d. at 4. Senator Goldwater called the country's
youth "the finest generation that has ever come along." Id. Anthropologist Margaret
Mead observed that it is "not only the best educated generation ... but.., more
mature than young people in the past." Id.
The double location in which the generation is constantly pictured-the terrain
of the university and the terrain of Vietnam (for the explicit portrait of soldiers, see
infra note 150 and accompanying text)-underscores the fact that participation both
in the war and in war protest provided Congress with its evidence. This double
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ciary Committee report, the original age of twenty-one is itself
located in military service:
The 21 year age of maturity is derived only from historical
accident. In the eleventh century 21 was the age at which most
males were physically capable of carrying armor. But the physical
ability to carry armor in the eleventh century clearly has no
relation to the intellectual and emotional qualifications to vote in
twentieth century America.
149
The report actually proceeded to argue that the new generation can
physically carry its armor at eighteen, again signalling the curious
persistence with which the issue of arms is anchored in the notion
of material weight.
1 50
location is also stressed in the executive summary for the House deliberations:
As noted, the 91st Congress by extraordinary majorities in each Chamber
approved a Federal statute designed in part to lower the minimum voting
age to 18 in Federal, State, and local elections. This action expressed a
congressionaljudgment that the educational level reached by 18 year olds,
their civic and military obligations and their readiness and capacity to participate
in the political process rendered unreasonable a minimum voting age
classification above eighteen.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18,
H.R. REP. No. 37, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT ON LOWERING THE VOTING AGE].
The bill for lowering the voting age had first been introduced in 1942, and as the
Senate executive report noted, had been reintroduced at least once in every successive
year, 150 times in total. See SENATE REPORT ON LOWERING THE VOTING AGE, supra,
at 7-8. The timing of the bill-both its passage in 1971 and its original introduction
in 1942-illustrates the principle "[o]ld enough to fight, old enough to vote" in the
Senate Hearings. See Lowering the Voting Age to 18: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 157
(1970) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on Lowering the Voting Age] (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
149 SENATE REPORT ON LOWERING THE VOTING AGE, supra note 148, at 5.
150 Both anthropologist Dr. Margaret Mead and Vice President Agnew were
quoted to certify the speed of physical maturation and strength which, according to
Mead takes place three years earlier than it did in the 18th century, and according to
the Vice President happens "sooner" than it did fifty years ago. See SENATE REPORT
ON LOWERING THE VOTING AGE, supra note 148, at 5. In the full text of the hearings,
the issue of weight was even more explicit, as was the evidence that modern eighteen
year olds can carry their armor:
Strange as it may seem, the weight of armor in the 11 th century governs the
right to vote of Americans in the 20th century. The medieval justification
has an especially bitter relevance today, when millions of our 18-year-olds
are compelled to bear arms as soldiers, and thousands are dead in Vietnam.
Senate Hearings on Lowering the Voting Age supra note 148, at 157 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy). Moreover, the testimony on behalf of lowering the voting age came from
the full political spectrum. Senator Goldwater, like Senator Kennedy, was a strong
exponent of the amendment. See Senate Hearings on Lotuering the Voting Age supra
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So, too, and far more profoundly, the fifteenth amendment,
which extended the vote to blacks during the Reconstruction
period, was inseparable from the military record: 180,000 blacks
had fought in the union army, and this fact was used in arguments
supporting the new amendment in Republican newspapers like the
Chicago Tribune and New York Tribune,1 5 1 in the 1868 presiden-
tial campaign,152 and on the floor of Congress. 5 3  Lincoln's
"Emancipation Proclamation" had itself been a brilliant merging of
two separate verbal acts-a proclamation of emancipation and a call
to arms:
I do order and declare, that all persons held as slaves.., are and
hereafter shall be free... and I further declare and make known,
that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the
armed service of the United States, to garrison forts, positions,
stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said
service.
154
note 148, at 132-33 (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
151 Conversation with Kenneth Stampp (Oct. 25, 1987).
152 At their nominating convention in Chicago in May 1868, the Republican party
announced the promise of black suffrage in their presidential platform. The idiom
of the pledge directly anchored it in the recent bearing of arms: "The guarantee by
Congress of equal suffrage to all loyal men at the South was demanded by every
consideration of public safety, of gratitude, and ofjustice...." CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess. 691 (1869).
For example, speeches on behalf of the amendment in the House specifically
referred to the war: "If the measure proposed by the joint resolution should be
approved ... that race which stood firm and battled for the Union in the nation's
struggle will have a voice in the selection of our rulers." See CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess., app. 92 (1869). The memory of service in the Civil War continued
to be enabling at the polls for many decades. In 1901, for example, the newly formed
state constitutions of both Alabama and Virginia listed military participation in the
Civil War among the factors which fulfilled the "residency" requirement for voting.
See ALA. CONST. 1901 § 180, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUC-
TION: PoLITICAL, MILITARY, SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, EDUCATIONAL, AND INDUSTRIAL, 1865
TO 1906, at 453, 454 (W. Fleming ed. 1966) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
RECONSTRUCTION]. The Virginia Constitution of 1901 has practically the same
provision. Id. at 453. The coupling of bearing arms and civil liberties is also evident
in later wars. During the 1941 congressional deliberations over the declaration of war
withJapan, for example, Representative Mitchell pledged on the floor of the House
"the continued loyalty not only of the first congressional District.... but that of the
15,000,000 Negroes in America" and asked Congress to remember that in light of his
life-altering military sacrifices of the past and the present, "the Negro expects the
same treatment under our so-called democratic form of government that is accorded
all other citizens." 87 CONG. REC. 9525-26 (1941).
154 Lincoln, The [Emancipation] Proclamation, in The Liberator, Jan. 2, 1863,
reprinted in THE ANTISLAVERY ARGUMENT 481, 482 (W. Pease &J. Pease eds. 1965).
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The fifteenth amendment reenacted in reverse the merged logic of
self-authorization: as liberty in 1863 made inevitable the eligibility
to bear arms, so eligibility to bear arms in 1869 made inevitable the
liberty to vote.
155
The association of the right to bear arms and the right to vote
has sometimes worked to contract, rather than continually to
extend, the franchise for blacks156 and for women. Section two
of the fourteenth amendment, for example, bypassed the possibility
of women's suffrage by expressing its protection of the voting
population in an idiom invented to express the requirements for the
militia: "male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of
age, and citizens of the United States." 157 But women's suffrage
was eventually achieved, both in the United States and in other
countries, in part by linking the capacity to vote with the capacity to
serve in war.158 Those who today urge the inclusion of women in
155 Lincoln's own correspondence enacted this circular logic of distributive rights.
For example, in his 1864 letter to Governor Hahn of Louisiana, he privately urged
the inclusion of blacks in the "elective franchise," especially "those who have fought
gallantly in our ranks." Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Governor Hahn (La.) (Mar.
13,1864), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 153,
at 112.
156 In 1870, for example, the Senate debated whether black Senator-elect Revels
met the constitutional requirement that a Senator have been a citizen for nine years;
those opposing his eligibility cited the exclusions of blacks from the militia in some
federal and state statutes between 1792 and 1815. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess. 125-30 (1870). Courts similarly have limited civil rights by associating them with
rights of arms. For example, ChiefJustice Taney, in arguing in the Dred Scott decision
against the plaintiff's status as a free person, pointed out that such status would
attribute to the plaintiff the power not only to have standing in court, but also to vote
and to bear arms. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 415-18, 420 (1857); see
also S. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONsTrrU-
TIONAL RIGHT 108-23 (1984) (noting the effects of the black codes on the formulation
and passage of the fourteenth amendment); Kates, supra note 36, at 216 (discussing
the post-Civil War black codes that arose to disarm blacks).
157 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Conversation with Professor Akhil Amar (Oct.
15, 1987).
I5s Suffrage pageants in the United States linked the two imagistically by the
inclusion of songs such as Onward Glorious Soldiers, whose chorus moves back and
forth between the literal act of "marching on to war" and the analogous act of
"marching as to war." See H. MACKAYE, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: A CHRONICLE PAGEANT,
in THE SUFFRAGIST, Dec. 11, 1915, at 7, 8 (emphasis added). Women's capacity for
military service, boxing, and the handling of guns continually reappeared in suffrage
plays. See G. MIDDLETON, BACK OF THE BALLOT (1915); A. MILLER, UNAUTHORISED
INTERvIEWs (1917); G. RUGG, THE NEW WOMAN (1896); M. WINsOR, A SUFFRAGE
RUMMAGE SALE (1913), reprinted in ON TO VICTORY: PROPAGANDA PLAYS OF THE
WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 325, 363, 130, 243 (B. Friedl ed. 1987). Articles
coupled the contribution of women in World War I with the comingvote, both in the
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military service (whether a voluntary or a drafted army) argue that
the burden of defending the country must be distributed across
genders so that the civil rights attached to those military obligations
also will be fairly distributed across genders. 159 The logic of that
coupling is clear: from the earliest moments of the republic to the
most recent, the concept of the civil franchise has been inseparable
from the record of military participation. The historical record also
makes clear the implications of the present nuclear situation: a
form of weaponry that eliminates the population of men and women
from the sphere of military authorization eventually divests them of
their civil authority as well.
In both the negative, and more often positive, instances, the
structural equivalences between voting and bearing arms underscore
the shared access they provide to the governing of the country, in
peace and in war. Elections, reapportionment cases, and constitu-
United States and in Denmark. See War and Freedom, in THE SUFFRAGIST, Dec. 11,
1915, at 6, 6. In England, suffragists celebrated soldiers such as Boadicea andJoan
of Arc in pageant banners and visual representations of their movement. See
Macdonald, Boadicea: Warrior, Mother and Myth, in IMAGES OF WOMEN IN PEACE AND
WAR: CROSS-CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTWES 40, 55-56 (S. Ardener, P.
Holden & S. MacDonald eds. 1987). In Russia, the call for women's suffrage during
one period of World War I was closely associated with the creation of a battalion of
women volunteers to compensate for the alarming number of male desertions. See
A. WILTSHER, MOST DANGEROUS WOMEN 176-81 (1985). Crucial in all these examples
is the conflation of a civil right such as voting with possession of authority in military
affairs. That voice may be on the side of militarism or instead on the side of
pacifism, as in the Puget Sound Project, Greenham Common, and the Seneca
Women's Encampment against nuclear weapons.
159 The National Organization of Women, for example, argued this in their report
before the 1980 House Hearings on the Draft: "Those who oppose the registration
and draft for females say they seek to protect women. But omission from the
registration and draft ultimately robs women of the right to first class citizenship ....
Moreover, because men exclude women here, theyjustify excluding women from the
decision-making of our nation." Judiciary Implications of Drafi Registration: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 157, 155-68 (1980). In the 1869 essay,
The Subjection of WomenJohn Stuart Mill repeatedly affirmed the inextricability of civil
liberty and military responsibility:
To Englishmen [being governed by a Queen] does not seem in the least
degree unnatural, because they are used to it; but they do feel it unnatural
that women should be soldiers or members of Parliament. In the feudal ages,
on the contrary, war and politics were not thought unnatural to women,
because [they were] not unusual .... There can be little doubt that Spartan
experience [of bodily exercise and training for women] suggested to Plato
... the social and political equality of the two sexes.
Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, LAW, AND EDUCATION BYJOHN
STUART MILL 270 (J. Robson ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
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tional care about numerical translations from the population base
to representation all exemplify what the Supreme Court in Baker v.
Carr called the "distribution of political strength for legislative
purposes." 160 So, too, the right to bear arms holds within it the
assertion of a just distribution of military power for war-making
purposes.
M. THE REQUIREMENT FOR DOUBLE AUTHORIZATION IN BOTH
WAR-MAKING AND CONSTITUTION-MAKING
Throughout this argument, war-making and law-making have
been steadily implicated in one another, both as those acts are
performed by the population and by Congress. The distribution of
arms, I have argued, mimics the problems of reapportionment. The
bearing of arms is interwoven with the history of voting. The draft,
said Alexander Bickel, entails a series of informal referenda.161
Jacob Javits, as he ushered the War Powers Resolution through the
Senate, described "the exclusive authority of Congress to 'declare
war'" not as one of Congress's powers but as that power "which the
framers of the Constitution regarded as the keystone of the whole
Article of Congressional power." 162 Justice Story identified the
moment of shifting the nation from a state of peace to a state of war
as "the highest act of legislation." 163 Rather than allowing the
coupling of law-making and war-making to remain a loose analogy,
I want to end by stressing that the equation is quite literal. 164
160 Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 197 (1962) (citing Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824,
826 (1959)).
161 See A. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 102-03.
162 See Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on the War Powers Ac, 93rd
Cong., lst Sess. 1403 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits, N.Y.).
16 J. STORY, supra note 5, at 87. The congressional obligation to oversee the
entry into war is in many additional places referred to as a set of "legislative"
responsibilities. See, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 258 (1886) (noting that the
Constitution authorizes Congress "to legislate [the militia's] organization, army, and
discipline").
164 The argument that follows summarizes the relation between war-making and
constitution-making specifically within the U. S. Constitution; but the connections are,
of course, much broader. On the relation between the two in social contract theory,
see supra notes 1-5, 25, 50-51, 55-56, 83-87 and accompanying text. The connection
also emerges historically, both at the original moment of contract formation and at
the moment of ratification in representative assemblies. In his examination of the
birth of the 5,000 major European cities between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries,
HaroldJ. Berman showed that they did not simply "emerge" but were instead self-
consciously "formed" by means of explicit contracts, collective oaths taken by the
entire community. See H. BERMAN, LAW AND REvOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
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Congressional legislation obviously lacks the weight of constitu-
tional law. The greater authority of the latter derives not from its
age, the Constitution will always be under continuous revision, but
from the fact that it has two consensual locations. Like statutory
law, it originates in verbal actions-declarations, proposals, resolu-
tions-confirmed by the full bicameral congressional assembly. But
unlike statutory law, it then migrates out to the population where
it must be ratified. The very congressional vote, that within the
statutory framework transforms a verbal proposal into a "law,"
within the constitutional framework, merely transforms a proposal
into a more formal proposal. It retains its character as a verbal
construct. A two-thirds vote in the House and a two-thirds vote in
the Senate-the size of a vote ordinarily required to pass a law, even
over a presidential veto, makes it a proposed amendment that then
goes before the state assemblies for ratification. 165 The require-
ment of authorization both from the Congress and from the people
tests the nature of representation both in terms of politics and
language. The population votes for representatives who vote for a
proposed law, which is then sent back to the population for their
approval. The process constitutes a literal referendum: an act of
referring back and a return to the original ground of political
empowerment and linguistic delegation.
The Constitution reserves this requirement for a double location
of authorization almost exclusively for constitution-making. A
jealous guardian of its own exalted status, the Constitution places
encumbrances on its own genesis that ensure its separation from all
other legislative products. The single other phenomenon to which
the Constitution accords this double authorizing ground, and hence
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 361-63, 367-68, 374, 376, 383, 396 (1983). In many cases
the charters or social contracts were "'communes for peace' (communiapro pace)" that
included provisions for self-government such as voting and bearing arms. See id. at
368. Historical analysis of the formation of general assemblies in France suggests that
such assemblies came into being specifically for war-making purposes. The king,
needing to elicit the consent of the population to fight the war, negotiated with the
assemblies as a prelude to requiring a war subsidy from local populations. See Taylor,
Assemblies of Towns and War Subsidy, 1318-1319, in STUDIES IN EARLY FRENCH
TAXATION 109, 167-72 (J. Strayer 8c C. Taylor eds. 1939); see also Taylor, An Assembly
of French Towns in March, 1318, 13 SPECULUM 295 (1938). As in the United States
experience, the French consent requirements were intensified, rather than relaxed,
by the context of war.165 See U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing that proposed amendments may originate
either in the Congress or among the population through two-thirds of the state
legislatures).
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the single other phenomenon which acquires a gravity equal to its
own, is that of war-making. The two doctrinal sites on war-firstly,
article I, section 8 and secondly, the second amendment-literally re-
enact this double location of certification. War originates in article
I, section 8 as a proposition, a verbal performative, a "declaration"
in Congress. The proposal must then be substantiated by the call
to arms, in which the proposal either is ratified or refused,
depending on what portion of the population approves of the
country's military participation. This is the second amendment. At
the original constitutional convention, the last minute shift in the
phrasing of article I, section 8-replacing "to make war" with "to
declare war" 166 -registered the fact that though far less speculative
a sentence than the moment before the congressional vote, the
"declaration" has not yet left the realm of verbal performance. The
declaration of war is extraordinary because, in front of the eyes of
the world, the representative assembly puts at risk the very
population it exists to represent. It puts at risk the ground of its
own authorization. The assumption or rejection of the risk by the
population-the referenda, the ratification-is therefore crucial. As
only the population can "make" the constitutional changes that
Congress "proposes," so only the population can "make" the war
that Congress declares.
The fact that article I, section 8 was written by the Federal
Assembly, and that the second amendment emerged out of the
ratification debates, reconfirms the double consensual location. The
argument is often made that the emergency context of international
security in a nuclear age necessarily entails some abbreviation or
relaxation of the consent procedures followed during peacetime.
But together article I, section 8 and the second amendment make
it clear that the Constitution guarantees just the reverse: consent
processes will be more rigorous, not less rigorous, in wartime. It
guarantees that the act of consenting will be more express, not less
express, for it requires a literal "declaration." It guarantees that the
distributive mechanisms will be heightened and amplified through
the full vote of both houses and the popular referenda, not relaxed
and contracted down to a central authority. Accidental convergen-
ces of language are not actually accidental. The language of consent
became explicit during ratification (we the people of Virginia, of
South Carolina, of New York do assent to and ratify.. .),just as the
166 See MADISON REARRANGED, supra note 47, at 513-14.
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word "consent" became explicit in, indeed almost inseparable from,
the colonial, pre-revolutionary, and post-revolutionary dialogue on
the standing army. The coincidence of its iteration accurately
reflects the rigor, expressness, and distributional breadth in both
constitution-making and constitutionally sanctioned war-making.
In both constitution-making and war-making, this heightened
process of consent takes a isible, material form. The materiality is
signalled in the fleeting iteration of the awkward but strangely
positive little word "clog." George Mason described the participa-
tion of both houses and the slowing down of war that results as
"clogging,"167 and Madison, complaining of the delay in the New
York state ratification convention that would lead to the Bill of
Rights, described it as a "clog" that would lead to some "condi-
tion."168 Both the making of constitutions and the making of war
must be clotted with matter-clogged with "intervening layers of
possibly resistant humanity"1 69 -to give them a gravity and weight
consonant with the gravity of the risks brought about. Precisely
because human sentience is at stake in the outcome of constitution-
al revisions and wars, human sentience must also be acutely and
elaborately present when both are authorized.
An obstructionist materiality or (in its positive expression) a
substantiating materiality resides at the center of both constitution-
making and constitutionally sanctioned war-making. This materiali-
ty lies beneath the insistent bodily idiom that occurs in both
spheres. In the sphere of war-making, the idiom surfaces (as has
been visible throughout this essay) in an unexpected array of
locations: the stress on "firmness" in Gandhi's conception of
nonviolent resistance, 170 the idiom of "ruggedness" and "boasted
weight and strength" in the advocacy of a distributed American
militia,17 1 the odd invocation of the physical properties of a
shotgun in Miller v. United States,172 and the collaborative "road-
clogging" performed by combatants and hungry horses in World
War I France. 173 The same physical idiom of weight, firmness,
and embodiedness has from the earliest moments of the nation
been used to describe acts of legislative ratification. Among the
167 See supra text accompanying note 119.
168 See supra text accompanying note 49.
169 See supra text accompanying note 127.
170 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
171 See supra text accompanying note 97.
172 See supra text accompanying note 105.
173 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
WAR AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
"[f]acts [to] be submitted to a candid world" by the Declaration of
Independence was the charge that the king "has dissolved Represen-
tative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his
invasions on the rights of the people." 174 So echoic of militaiy
resistance is this description of the population's legislative resistance
that it might with ease be mistaken for its kindred form of obstruc-
tion.
During the later period of actual constitutional ratification, the
participants repeatedly described the process as one of materializa-
tion. While Madison's attribution of the world "clog" to the New
York ratification was uttered derisively,17 5 those resisting passage of
an unamended Constitution announced their clogging materiality
with pride. The most articulate exegeses came from Patrick Henry:
I declare, that if twelve states and a half had adopted [the
unamended Constitution], I would, with manly firmness, and in
spite of an erring world, reject it.
176
Gentlemen strongly urge, its adoption will be a mighty benefit
to us; but, sir, I am made of so incredulous materials, that assertions
and declarations do not satisfy me.
177
Henry's language was echoed by similar declarations in the other
states' debates, where ratification was repeatedly envisaged either as
a bodily internalization of the document 178 or instead as a fusion
of body and document.179 The proposed document was perceived
as an insubstantial piece of paper: "[T]he paper on the table," said
Madison;180  "[T]hat on your table," said Patrick Henry;1"'
"[T]he paper before you," said Governor Randolph; 18 2 "[T]hat
paper on your table," said Mr. Nicholas.1 8 3 These phrases suggest
174 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). On the adjective
"manly" prefixed to the word "firmness," see supra note 100.
175 See supra text accompanying note 49.
176 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 771 (emphasis added).
177 Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
178 For example, the idiom of internalization was audible in the Massachusetts
debate when General Thompson, protesting the absence of a Bill of Rights, spoke of
ratification as the "swallowing" and "digesting" of an only partly ingestible document.
See id. at 683. The idiom reappeared in South Carolina's debate in which Mr. Dollard
spoke of the refusal to ratify as provoking the standing army to "ram it down their
throats." Id. at 753.
179 See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
180 See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 823.
181 See id. at 809; see also id. at 813 ("the plan on the table").
182 See id. at 821.
183 See id. at 829; see also supra note 39.
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how fragile, how provisional the document was prior to its confirma-
tion, seemingly deriving its sturdiness from the table alone. For the
participants during the debates, the document did not yet have any
substantial weight, and it could only acquire weight by annexing the
participants' own materiality: "You have not solid reality-the hearts
and hands of the men who are to be governed." 18 "Will gentle-
men, then, lay their hands on their hearts, and say that they can
adopt it in this shape?" 185 The Constitution would only become
law, they repeatedly said, if they put a hand to it, if they put their
hearts to it, if they stood behind it.186 The ratification assemblies
provided the sentient base for substantiation and, somewhat
remarkably, made vocal and explicit the nature of the materializa-
tion process.
The very requirement of materiality impedes the alteration of
the Constitution and protects it against unexamined legal flights of
fancy. Over five thousand amendments have in two centuries been
proposed. Of these five thousand, thirty-three have left the
Congress with a two-thirds vote in both House and Senate; of these
thirty-three, twenty-six have then received the ratifying vote of the
states. 187 Thus 4,974 have been prevented from acquiring consti-
tutional reality by the encumbering process, the same encumbering
184 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 818 (quoting Patrick Henry).
185 Id. at 827. When the amendments were eventually passed, Patrick Henry and
Richard Henry Lee believed that the final document still insufficiently protected the
population against presidential concentration of power and a standing army.
Significantly, both continued to express their reservations in terms of the document's
lack of materialization. In a letter, Patrick Henry wrote to Lee: "For Rights, without
having power & might is but a shadow." See 3 PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPON-
DENCE AND SPEECHES 398 (W. Henry ed. 1891) (emphasis added). Lee responded:
"Your observation is perfectly just.... [Tihe english language has been carefully
culled to find words feeble in their nature .... " Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
186 Metaphorical use of parts of the body becomes even more literal when
describing war. On the use of the body for substantiating issues of war, see E.
SCARRY, supra note 27, at 119-21, 124-39, 143-48, 350 n.138.
187 See Dellinger, The Legitimay of Constitutional Change: Rethinkingthe Amendment
Process, 97 HARv. L. REv. 386, 427 (1983). Because amending the Constitution
through article V is so cumbersome, the Constitution may appear to prohibit ongoing
consent, subjecting those in the present to the will of the past. For a counter-
argument, see supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. On the reconcilability of
democracy and the Constitution, see Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of
Democracy, in CONSTrrUTIONAMsM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (J. Elster & R. Slagstad eds.
1988). Holmes argued that "imaginative interpretation" by each successive generation
is a supplementary way of amending the Constitution. See id. at 224; see also Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 45, at 1051-58, 1098-99 (describing methods of
amending the Constitution outside article V through the direct actions of the
population).
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process that has given the surviving twenty-six their weight and
solidity."s We lack the means to calculate how many thousands
of wars have passed through the minds of solitary individuals, how
many fewer of these wars would have seemed plausible once
reviewed by a council, and how many still fewer of these would have
received the population's enactment. Perhaps, like the ratio of
amendments, we collectively fight twenty-six of every 5000 wars that
are individually imagined. Though numerically incalculable, the
clogging process at least can be glimpsed in the story of the wild La
Courtine horses blocking the road in World War I France,18 9 as
well as the many other occasions in which the encumbering actions
of strike, demonstration, or rebellion, either at the threshold or the
center, have impeded the waging of war, bringing it (at least for a
time) to a stop.19
This requirement for materiality-the assent of person after
person after person iterated thousands of times-makes it hard to
make constitutions and hard to declare wars with speed and
efficiency. But it is also precisely this encumbering materiality that
gives both constitution-making and constitutionally sanctioned war-
making their capacity to secure our liberty. William Sumner
articulated the relation between armed resistance and legislative
resistance. Describing the way the distribution of military authority
to a wide population endows the country with a thick materiality or
a highly textured surface, he wrote, "[t]he general unevenness of
our country; the numerous obstructions to the progress of an enemy,
which its woods, rocks, ravines, rivers, meadows, mountains, mills,
stone walls, and villages present, are peculiarly favourable to militia
operations." 91 As Sumner proceeded to elaborate at length, this
188 Hamilton and Madison both applied the language of "solidity" or "substance"
to the population's ratification. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (A. Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 252-53 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
189 See supra notes 16, 173 and accompanying text.
19 That a population "authorizes" the infliction of injury does not mean
necessarily that their actions are "justified." Authorization and justification entail two
distinct sets of requirements. Nevertheless, a claim that the waging of a particular
war is "justified" must fail in a contractual society if the population has not authorized
the war. In this sense, authorization logically precedes justification, even though
experientially the chronology may be reversed: in order to secure the population's
authorization, a government may have to begin by identifying the justifying
conditions. The relation of the two terms was clarified for me by a conversation with
Stephen Knapp in Berkeley, Cal. (Nov. 19, 1987).
191 See An Inquiry Into the Importance of the Militia, supra note 34, at 21 (emphasis
added).
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impedes an enemy's entry into the country far more effectively than
does a centralized army, which may disappear after a single battle.
In discussing the constitutional guarantees provided by the doctrinal
formulation of the right to bear arms, Sumner returned to the word
"obstruction" as the mysterious center of political liberty: "Obsta
principiis."1 92 The Constitution, through a provision such as the
second amendment, works by obstruction; it anticipates and
eliminates the possibility of executive tyranny. It thereby eliminates
the need for the population even to have to speculate about so
ungracious a possibility. Both our Constitution and our constitu-
tionally mandated requirements for a distributed defense system
thus protect our political liberty through the benign material
principles of obstruction and substantiation.
CONCLUSION
I have been arguing that nuclear weapons themselves constitute
a large tear in the social contract. When one contemplates the
physical attributes of nuclear war-the scale of the hurt involved in
images we all know-it may seem beside the point to add that there
is a tear in the social contract. But those physical attributes-the
irrecoverable injury to people, to all they have made, and to the
earth-that is the tear in the contract. That is what it looks like
when a social contract is torn up. For that reason, it seems
important to bring our own contract to bear on the problem. The
right to bear arms has been said, not uncontroversially, to contain
within it the right of revolution. 193 Either we ourselves can bear
arms and change the situation by revolution, or as seems more
plausible and desirable, we can bring into view the pre-revolutionary
situation and call for judicial recognition of the distributive intent
of the right to bear arms.
192 See id. at 37 (emphasis added).
198 This is a final instance of the deep structural continuity between constitution-
making and war-making: the right to bear arms contains the right of revolution.
Similarly, as Walter Dellinger has argued persuasively, article V's provision for
constitutional amendment represents the right of revolution built into the contract.
See Dellinger, supra note 187, at 431.
